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Abstract
Are defense attorneys sandbagging in their death-penalty cases? In Poindexter v. Mitchell, a habeas corpus
case decided in 2006, Chief Judge Danny Boggs of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
wrote that by conducting a deliberately defective investigation into mitigation evidence that might otherwise
have been presented at the penalty phase of a capital trial, a defense attorney can virtually guarantee that any
death sentence the jury returns will be vacated in later proceedings. The likelihood of such an outcome, Boggs
wrote, will more than make up for the somewhat greater chance that a jury that does not hear the missing
mitigation evidence will return a death sentence in the first place. Boggs and his concurring colleague, Judge
Richard Suhrheinrich, challenged conventional wisdom holding that sandbagging - the intentional
withholding of (or failure to develop) meritorious arguments or useful evidence at trial by criminal defense
attorneys, for the purpose of undermining a conviction or sentence in later proceedings - does not work. But
these critiques of sandbagging have focused upon a different type of intentional error, the failure to raise
timely objections at trial. Tactical Ineffective Assistance in Capital Trials focuses on whether defense attorneys
in death-penalty cases have an incentive, in the form of better results for their clients, to ignore or bury
mitigation evidence. This Comment concludes that the Boggs hypothesis suffers from several flaws, and that
this particular form of sandbagging typically (though not necessarily always) represents bad strategy. Not only
will a defense attorney contemplating this type of ineffective assistance rarely possesses the knowledge and
perspective that will allow him or her to foresee the utility of sandbagging in a given case, but deliberate
ineffective assistance through a failure to investigate or present mitigation evidence may backfire for a number
of reasons.
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 INTRODUCTION 
Are defense attorneys deliberately providing ineffective 
representation at the penalty phase of capital trials?  Two judges on 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently 
suggested that they should—if they want to keep their clients off 
death row.  In a concurring opinion in Poindexter v. Mitchell,1 a habeas 
corpus appeal decided in 2006, Sixth Circuit Chief Judge Danny 
Boggs identified a scenario in which intentional errors by counsel 
may benefit death-eligible defendants.2  Boggs opined that a defense 
attorney trying a capital case is likely to secure the reversal of any 
death sentence that the jury might return if he or she deliberately 
conducts an inadequate investigation into his or her client’s troubled 
childhood, psychological problems, or other mitigating evidence that 
might otherwise have been presented at sentencing.3  The probability 
of eventual reversal on ineffective assistance grounds, Boggs wrote, 
will more than make up for any greater chance that a jury that does 
not hear the missing material will arrive at a death sentence in the 
first place.4  While Judge Boggs stopped short of accusing defense 
attorneys of employing these tactics, his colleague Judge Richard 
Suhrheinrich was not so restrained.5  In his own concurring opinion 
in Poindexter, Suhrheinrich intimated that defense attorneys in capital 
cases actually were sowing ineffective assistance claims of the sort 
described by his colleague.6
Poindexter sparked renewed debate over “sandbagging” by criminal 
defense attorneys.7  Depending upon whom one asks, sandbagging—
 1. 454 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 2. Id. at 587–89 (Boggs, C.J., concurring). 
 3. Id. at 588. 
 4. Id. at 589. 
 5. Compare id. at 587–89 (identifying the potential of defense attorney 
sandbagging during the penalty phase of a capital trial), with id. at 589 
(Suhrheinrich, J., concurring) (referring to his prior encounter with questionable 
defense attorney conduct as described in his opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part in Thompson v. Bell, 373 F.3d 688, 692 (6th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 545 
U.S. 794 (2005)). 
 6. 454 F.3d at 589. 
 7. E.g., Posting of Jonathan Adler to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh. 
com/posts/1153939690.shtml (July 26, 2006, 14:48 EST) (discussing the Poindexter 
decision); Posting of Russ Bensing to The Briefcase, http://briefcase8.com/ 
2006/07/ (July 26, 2006, 07:47 EST) (observing that “Judge Boggs’ comment about 
the irony of the situation . . . is unquestionably accurate”); Posting of S. Cotus to 
Appellate Law & Practice, http://appellate.typepad.com/appellate/2006/10/ 
judge_daughtrey.html (Oct. 19, 2006, 16:58 EST) (asserting that Chief Judge Boggs 
is “clueless about capital defense”); Posting of Carolyn Elefant to Legal Blog Watch, 
http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/legal_blog_watch/2006/07/would_you_rende.
html (July 25, 2006, 14:27 EST) (describing the Boggs concurrence as “insulting” but 
not expressing an opinion as to its accuracy). 
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the intentional withholding of, or failure to develop, meritorious 
arguments or useful evidence at trial by criminal defense attorneys 
for the purpose of attacking a conviction or sentence in later 
proceedings8—is either a pervasive threat or an urban legend.  While 
several courts have voiced concerns about this sort of gamesmanship,9 
a majority of commentators have downplayed the threat posed by 
these tactics.  These skeptics have concluded that the risks associated 
with sandbagging are too high, and the benefits too speculative and 
remote, for this sort of intentional error to gain much currency as a 
defense strategy.10  The Boggs and Suhrheinrich concurrences 
 8. Graham Hughes, Sandbagging Constitutional Rights:  Federal Habeas Corpus and 
the Procedural Default Principle, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 321, 333 (1988) 
(defining sandbagging as “deliberately not raising a point in a timely fashion in order 
to have a fresh chance, if things go badly, of attacking a conviction later”). 
 9. E.g., Walls v. Bowersox, 151 F.3d 827, 836 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1998) (viewing with 
“extreme skepticism” counsel’s admission of his own ineffectiveness, particularly 
given the attorney’s prior statement that “trial strategy was driven, in part, with an eye 
to providing [the petitioner with] a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on habeas review,” and noting in a footnote that “any type of ‘sandbagging’ 
is ‘not only unethical, but usually bad strategy as well’”) (quoting United States v. 
Day, 969 F.2d 39, 49 n.9 (3d Cir. 1992)); United States v. Sisto, 534 F.2d 616, 624 n.9 
(5th Cir. 1976) (“If the record indicates that counsel for the complaining party 
deliberately avoided making the proper objection or request, plain error will almost 
never be found.  This court will not tolerate ‘sandbagging’—defense counsel lying in 
wait to spring post-trial error.”); Andrews v. Barnes, No. 89-C-0649 S, 1989 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 17246, at *95 n.68 (D. Utah Aug. 17, 1989) (“Those who suggest sandbagging 
and new issue generation claims are not significant . . . simply ignore reality.  
Certainly every death case seems to involve such considerations.”); Martin v. 
Blackburn, 521 F. Supp. 685, 706 (E.D. La. 1981) (discussing the possibility of 
defense sandbagging in capital cases:   “A defendant could withhold cumulative 
evidence as his ace-in-the-hole should the jury or judge return a capital sentence, and 
should the jury fail to return a death sentence, the defendant would have lost 
nothing.”); cf. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277–78 (2005) (observing, in another 
context, that “capital petitioners might deliberately engage in dilatory tactics to 
prolong their incarceration and avoid execution of the sentence of death”). 
A generation ago, the majority and dissenting opinions in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 
U.S. 72 (1977), voiced different opinions concerning the threat posed by 
sandbagging.  Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist explained that a failure to 
strictly enforce contemporaneous-objection rules “may encourage ‘sandbagging’ on 
the part of defense lawyers, who may take their chances on a verdict of not guilty in a 
state trial court with the intent to raise their constitutional claims in a federal habeas 
court if their initial gamble does not pay off.”  Id. at 89.  These comments prompted 
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, to respond that “no rational lawyer would 
risk the ‘sandbagging’ feared by the Court.”  Id. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 10. E.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 n.7 (1986) (“No reasonable 
lawyer would forego competent litigation of meritorious, possibly decisive claims on 
the remote chance that his deliberate dereliction might ultimately result in federal 
habeas review.”); John H. Blume & Pamela A. Wilkins, Death by Default:   State 
Procedural Default Doctrine in Capital Cases, 50 S.C. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (1998) (asserting 
that defense counsel typically lack the sophistication necessary to engage in 
successful sandbagging); Stephen B. Bright, Death by Lottery—Procedural Bar of 
Constitutional Claims in Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent 
Defendants, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 679, 694 (1990) (opining that “almost any lawyer is 
going to try to prevail in the forum where the case is tried, not ‘save’ an issue for an 
uncertain later day in a court whose composition and receptiveness to the issue 
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suggested that this conventional wisdom may not apply to deliberate 
failures to investigate and present mitigation evidence in death-
penalty cases.11  If the two judges are correct—if this type of 
sandbagging happens, and works—they raise a host of important and 
worrisome questions concerning the motives and performance of 
capital defense attorneys, and the adequacy of existing deterrents to 
this sort of behavior. 
If they are correct, that is.  Judge Martha Daughtrey, the third 
member of the Poindexter panel, saw her colleagues as overstating the 
likelihood of intentional ineffective assistance.  Daughtrey described 
the Boggs concurrence as “an affront to the dedication of the women 
and men who struggle tirelessly to uphold their ethical duty to 
investigate fully and present professionally all viable defenses 
available to their clients.”12  Though strongly worded, this response 
falls short of a persuasive rebuttal.  Ethical standards, consequences 
to reputation, and the threat of discipline have proven incapable of 
preventing merely incompetent representation that contributes to 
the execution of defendants.13  How can it be assumed that these 
cannot possibly be calculated at the time of trial”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking 
About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 748, 791 (1987) (observing that “it is 
difficult to see what an attorney may gain by sandbagging”); Henry J. Friendly, Is 
Innocence Irrelevant?:   Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 
158 (1970) (positing that only in rare circumstances would a lawyer refrain from 
raising a legitimate claim to preserve a potential future habeas claim and adding that 
proving that an attorney employed such a strategy would be challenging); Hughes, 
supra note 8, at 336–37 (“So few cases are won on appeal (and even fewer at some 
later postconviction stage) that such a strategy would rarely be prudent.”); John C. 
Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal 
Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 695 n.56 (1990) (doubting that sandbagging 
occurs frequently); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. 
L. REV. 1128, 1196–99 (1986) (reasoning that the likelihood of successful 
sandbagging is low, for various reasons); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 
893–94 (1984) (explaining why “[t]he sandbag argument . . . is unpersuasive for 
several reasons”); Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in 
State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 118 (1990) (“It is our studied conclusion, 
based on the extensive testimony on this question and our own experience, that 
capital trial and appellate lawyers rarely engage in the practice of sandbagging.”); 
Peter W. Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Representation of Counsel:   The 
Supreme Court Has Work to Do, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1, 43–46 (1978) (discounting the 
threat of sandbagging). 
 11. See Poindexter v. Mitchell, 454 F.3d 564, 587–89 (6th Cir. 2006) (Boggs, C.J., 
concurring) (discussing the logic behind intentionally ineffective investigations); id. 
at 589 (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring) (agreeing with Boggs). 
 12. Id. at 590 (Daughtrey, J., concurring). 
 13. See WELSH S. WHITE, LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH 3–9 (2006) 
(discussing “shockingly inadequate” performances by capital defense attorneys); 
Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor:   The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for 
the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1838–39 (1994) (describing capital defense 
counsel as being hamstrung by a lack of experience, funding and, in some cases, 
competence).  
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same deterrents preclude intentionally defective assistance that may 
save or prolong a client’s life? 
A more compelling response to the Boggs and Suhrheinrich 
concurrences would scrutinize the assumptions of law and practice 
that lie behind these opinions, to determine whether tactical failures 
to investigate or present mitigating evidence actually benefit capital 
defendants.  If this study establishes that deliberate ineffective 
assistance at the penalty phase does not work, then it becomes less 
necessary to worry about the debatable efficacy of other deterrents, 
because the counterproductive nature of this strategy will itself have a 
deterrent effect.  That is the purpose of this Article—to map against 
the law and the realities of death-penalty trials and post-conviction 
proceedings the hypothesis that defense attorneys in capital cases 
have an incentive, in the form of better results for their clients, to 
overlook, ignore, or bury potential mitigating evidence. 
This review suggests that the Boggs hypothesis suffers from several 
flaws.  True, an inexplicable failure by counsel to locate or present 
certain types of mitigating evidence may bring about the reversal of a 
death sentence, and reversals on this ground are more common than 
they were just a few years ago.14  A defense attorney contemplating 
ineffective assistance at trial, however, is infrequently blessed with the 
knowledge and perspective that will allow him or her to foresee the 
utility of sandbagging in a given case.15  One reason being, counsel 
must decide whether to embrace intentional error uncomfortably 
early in the investigatory process.16  Courts are sometimes willing to 
reverse death sentences on the ground that counsel failed to uncover 
mitigating material.17  These same tribunals tend to defer to informed 
decisions by attorneys not to present mitigating evidence of which they 
were aware.18  As a result, attorneys contemplating intentionally 
inadequate investigations face a dilemma.  If defense counsel 
terminates an investigation into mitigating material before it yields 
fruit, he or she typically will not know for sure whether additional 
probing at some later date will yield enough evidence to satisfy the 
 14. See discussion infra Part I.C (documenting the modest upward trend of 
successful ineffective counsel claims by comparing cases decided in 1987 and in 
2007). 
 15. See discussion infra Part III (discussing the difficulty with which the efficacy of 
deliberate ineffective assistance can be predicted). 
 16. See id. 
 17. See discussion infra Part I.D (discussing the willingness of modern courts to 
vacate death sentences issued after an unreasonably limited investigation into 
mitigation material by trial counsel).  
 18. See discussion infra Part I.D (addressing the different treatment of “failure to 
investigate” and “failure to present” ineffective assistance claims). 
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prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance claim.  If, on the other 
hand, counsel presses further and obtains this evidence, but declines 
to present it at trial, reversal will follow only if no legitimate strategic 
rationale exists for the decision not to place this material before the 
penalty-phase jury.  The law thus ensures that this brand of 
intentional ineffective assistance works best when counsel doesn’t 
know if it will work at all—hardly a recipe for sure-fire reversal. 
This uncertainty is not the sole infirmity of penalty-phase 
sandbagging.  A consciously ineffective investigation or presentation 
of mitigation evidence can backfire, increasing the odds that a 
defendant will be executed.  A reviewing court entertaining an 
ineffective assistance claim may conclude that a reasonable inquiry at 
the time of trial would not have uncovered the material in question, 
that the evidence would not have meaningfully altered the balance of 
aggravating and mitigating facts presented at trial, or that the claim 
of error is factually lacking, procedurally barred, or otherwise 
improperly presented for review.  Mitigation evidence also may 
disappear or become more difficult to locate during the interval 
between trial and post-trial investigation.  In these situations, 
intentionally defective work will not undermine a death sentence 
rendered by a jury that reached its decision without the benefit of 
mitigating evidence that a more thorough effort might have yielded.  
The likelihood of these counterproductive outcomes compels the 
conclusion that, more often than not, it is bad strategy to deliberately 
fail to investigate or present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase 
of a capital trial for the sole purpose of generating an ineffective 
assistance claim. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I reviews the mechanics of 
capital trials and describes the law applicable to failures by counsel to 
investigate or present mitigation material.  Part II considers Poindexter 
and its provocative concurring opinions.  Part III discusses prevailing 
views regarding defense sandbagging in general, and then examines 
whether Boggs and Suhrheinrich were right in departing from this 
received wisdom—in other words, whether deliberate failures to 
investigate and produce mitigation evidence actually improve the 
prospects of capital defendants.  Finally, the Conclusion to this piece 
addresses the handful of situations in which the Boggs hypothesis 
may have some merit, and suggests how courts might deal with the 
threat of intentional error in these circumstances. 
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I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AT THE PENALTY PHASE 
A. The Mechanics of Capital Trials 
The Poindexter debate over attorney sandbagging assumes a basic 
knowledge of the mechanics of capital trials.  Death penalty trials are 
divided into two stages:  a guilt phase, and an ensuing penalty phase.19  
At the guilt phase, the trier of fact decides whether the defendant has 
committed an offense for which the death penalty may be applied.20  
If the defendant is convicted of a death-eligible offense, the trial 
proceeds to the penalty phase.21  During this second phase, the 
parties present what are generally known as “aggravating” and 
“mitigating” facts.22  As these names imply, aggravating facts are those 
that tend to argue in favor of a harsher penalty, while mitigating facts 
militate in favor of a lesser sentence.23  The sentencing authority 
considers these facts together in arriving at a sentence.24   
The defense may present a wide variety of mitigation material at 
the penalty phase.25  Assuming that this evidence otherwise satisfies 
 19. Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life:   Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death 
Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 303 (1983). 
 20. The trier of fact for both the guilt and penalty phases must be a jury, unless 
waived by the parties (if and as permitted).  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 
(2002); see Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of 
Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1521–22 (2001) (discussing the rule applicable in 
several states, prohibiting a waiver of a jury trial in capital cases). 
 21. Whitney Cawley, Note, Raising the Bar:   How Rompilla v. Beard Represents the 
Court’s Increasing Efforts to Impose Stricter Standards for Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 
34 PEPP. L. REV. 1139, 1155 n.119 (2007). 
 22. Id. 
 23. By way of example, jury instructions promulgated by the Judicial Council of 
California define an “aggravating circumstance or factor” as “any fact, condition, or 
event relating to the commission of a crime, above and beyond the elements of the 
crime itself, that increases the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct, the enormity 
of the offense, or the harmful impact of the crime.”  JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., 
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 763 (Matthew Bender 2008).  A mitigating 
circumstance or factor is “any fact, condition, or event that makes the death penalty 
less appropriate as a punishment, even though it does not legally justify or excuse the 
crime.  A mitigating circumstance is something that reduces the defendant’s 
blameworthiness or otherwise supports a less severe punishment.”  Id. 
 24. Helen Gredd, Comment, Washington v. Strickland:   Defining Effective 
Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1544, 1547–48 (1983).  
For a discussion of the various frameworks that states have created to guide the 
sentencing authority’s consideration of these facts, see Darian B. Taylor, Capital 
Sentencing in Arizona, 42 ARIZ. ATT’Y 20, 21 (July / Aug. 2006), available at 
http://www.myazbar.org/AZAttorney/PDF_Articles/0706Capital.pdf.   
 25. At the penalty phase of a capital trial, “the sentencer [may] . . . not be 
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s 
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant 
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”  Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 
(1978).  However, the state may “set reasonable limits upon the evidence a defendant 
can submit, and to control the manner in which it is submitted” at capital 
sentencing.  Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 526 (2006) (upholding the exclusion at 
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generic admissibility standards26 (and sometimes, even if it doesn’t),27 
at the penalty phase a defendant can proffer testimony or other 
evidence concerning his or her character, family and social 
relationships, remorse, drug and alcohol problems, employment and 
educational history, lack of intelligence, physical and psychological 
issues, severe emotional disturbance at the time of the offense, and 
amenability to rehabilitation, as well as evidence concerning other 
potentially mitigating topics.28  Empirical studies suggest that the 
presentation of mitigating facts can make a difference in a capital 
trial, drawing jurors away from the death penalty and toward a life 
sentence.29  These studies assign special mitigating weight to evidence 
that a defendant suffers from a significant mental illness or defect, or 
that he or she weathered extreme childhood abuse.30  Most judges 
agree that mitigating facts can affect capital sentencing decisions.  As 
one court has said, “[m]itigation evidence affords an opportunity to 
humanize and explain.”31  And as will be detailed below, on 
capital sentencing of alibi evidence that was not presented at the guilt phase of the 
defendant’s trial). 
 26. See, e.g., People v. Stanley, 897 P.2d 481, 527–29 (Cal. 1995) (noting that, in 
general, evidence that does not satisfy traditional standards of reliability may be 
excluded from consideration at the penalty phase). 
 27. See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97–99 (1979) (determining that relevant 
hearsay evidence proffered by the defense that exhibits substantial indicia of 
reliability must be admitted at the penalty phase of a capital trial). 
 28. See Louis B. Bilionis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett 
Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 302–05 (1991) (discussing types of 
mitigating evidence). 
 29. See, e.g., Michelle E. Barnett, Stanley L. Brodsky & Cali Manning Davis, When 
Mitigation Evidence Makes a Difference:  Effects of Psychological Mitigating Evidence on 
Sentencing Decisions in Capital Trials, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 751, 762–66 (2004) 
(observing that jurors are more likely to sentence a defendant to death in a case 
without mitigating evidence than in a case with mitigating evidence); Stephen P. 
Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases:   What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1538, 1539, 1559 (1998) (noting that jurors respond well to evidence 
reducing the defendant’s individual responsibility for the crime).  But cf. Ursula 
Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death:   Guilt Is Overwhelming; 
Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation Is No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1011, 1041 
(2001) (reporting that interviews with jurors who returned death sentences “reflect a 
pattern in which mitigating factors play a disturbingly minor role in jurors’ 
deliberations about whether a defendant should be sentenced to death”).  See 
generally William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death:   
Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1987–1988) 
(surveying ten death penalty cases and the reasons why jurors voted one way or 
another in the penalty phases of these cases). 
 30. E.g., Garvey, supra note 29, at 1539, 1559. 
 31. Mayes v. Gibson, 210 F.3d 1284, 1288 (10th Cir. 2000); see Boyde v. California, 
494 U.S. 370, 382 (1990) (remarking upon a “belief, long held by this society, that 
defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged 
background or to emotional or mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants 
who have no such excuse”) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring)); Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 1000 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“Defense counsel’s use of mitigation evidence to complete, deepen, or 
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numerous occasions courts have reversed death sentences issued after 
an unreasonable failure by defense counsel to discover or present 
significant mitigation material prevented the sentencing authority 
from incorporating these facts into the life-or-death calculus.32
B. Strickland v. Washington:   The Deferential Baseline for Review of 
Ineffective Assistance Claims 
Claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel represent the 
preferred conduit through which a defendant may attack a failure by 
counsel to adequately investigate or competently present mitigation 
evidence at trial.  Ineffective assistance claims derive from the Sixth 
Amendment, which confers upon criminal defendants a right to 
counsel.33  This guarantee has been equated with a right to the effective 
assistance of counsel.34  Typically alleged on direct appeal or in a post-
conviction habeas corpus petition,35 a successful ineffective assistance 
claim will secure the inadequately represented defendant another 
opportunity to present his or her case before the trier of fact. 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must 
establish both deficient performance by counsel and resulting 
prejudice.  The United States Supreme Court identified these as the 
essential elements of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in 
Strickland v. Washington,36 decided in 1984.  The Strickland Court 
determined that a defendant or habeas corpus petitioner raising an 
ineffective assistance challenge to a conviction or sentence bears the 
burden of demonstrating, first, that counsel’s performance “fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness” under the 
circumstances.37  The defendant or petitioner must overcome a 
“strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance.”38  Second, the defendant 
contextualize the picture of the defendant presented by the prosecution can be 
crucial to persuading jurors that the life of a capital defendant is worth saving.”). 
 32. See infra note 59 (listing recent decisions in which the federal courts of 
appeals have vacated death sentences due to a failure by defense counsel to 
investigate or present mitigation evidence). 
 33. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 34. See Ivan K. Fong, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. 
L. REV. 461, 462 (1987) (discussing the origins of this right). 
 35.  See NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, FINAL TECHNICAL 
REPORT:  HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS 
CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE 
DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996  28 (2007), available at http://www.nicic.org/ 
Library/022519 (discussing the frequent invocation of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims in capital habeas petitions). 
 36. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 37. Id. at 688. 
 38. Id. at 689. 
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or habeas corpus petitioner must show that this deficient 
performance denied him or her of a fair trial.39  This prejudice 
standard is satisfied when a court detects a “reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”40  This “reasonable 
probability” threshold amounts to “a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome” of the proceeding at issue.41
Strickland was itself a capital case in which the petitioner asserted 
that his attorney had not presented enough mitigating evidence at 
the penalty phase of trial.  The Strickland Court therefore specifically 
addressed how courts should evaluate claims that counsel conducted 
an inadequate penalty-phase investigation, or made poor decisions 
with the information obtained through these efforts.42  On these 
points, the Court announced a framework for judicial review that 
focuses upon the thoroughness of counsel’s investigation.  Per 
Strickland: 
[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and 
facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; 
and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation 
are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional 
judgments support the limitations on investigation.  In other 
words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to 
make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 
unnecessary.  In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not 
to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the 
circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s 
judgments.43
The Strickland Court ultimately determined that the petitioner had 
not established ineffective assistance.44  His attorney had failed to 
present at sentencing mitigating evidence above and beyond his 
client’s lack of a serious criminal record, the petitioner’s remorse and 
acceptance of responsibility, and the emotional and mental 
disturbance the petitioner was experiencing at the time of the 
crimes.45  Nevertheless, the Court concluded that counsel did not act 
unreasonably by failing to put on additional evidence.46  The material 
 39. Id. at 687. 
 40. Id. at 694. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 690–91. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 673–74. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 675–76.  This additional mitigating evidence was relatively weak, 
consisting of statements by friends, neighbors and relatives that they would have 
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the attorney supposedly should have presented, the Court 
determined, might have opened the door to damaging rebuttal 
evidence by the prosecution.47  Moreover, the additional evidence 
would have contradicted the arguments that the defense raised at 
sentencing.48  The Court also concluded that the incremental 
mitigation material paled in light of the “overwhelming” aggravating 
factors arrayed against the petitioner, meaning that the petitioner 
suffered no prejudice from any omission.49
Strickland announced a lenient standard for reviewing the 
performance of counsel.50  The High Court maintained this forgiving 
approach in the years that followed.51  For example, in Burger v. 
Kemp,52 decided in 1987, a narrow majority of the Court held that an 
attorney was not ineffective for failing to present any mitigating 
evidence on behalf of a death-eligible client who was seventeen years 
old at the time of the crime.53  When he committed the crime, the 
petitioner had an IQ of eighty-two, functioned at the level of a twelve-
year-old, and possibly had suffered brain damage as a result of 
childhood beatings.54  A five-Justice majority found that it was 
reasonable for the petitioner’s trial counsel to decide not to 
introduce this and other mitigating evidence.55  As it had in Strickland, 
the Court concluded that this evidence could have opened the door 
to other damaging material, while compromising the defense strategy 
used at trial.56  Lower courts absolved equally questionable 
performances in the decade following Strickland,57 leading to the 
observation in one 1995 decision that “the cases in which habeas 
petitioners can properly prevail” with claims alleging that counsel 
testified if asked; a psychiatric report; and a psychological report that related that the 
petitioner was “chronically frustrated and depressed because of his economic 
dilemma” when he committed the crimes.  Id. 
 47. Id. at 699–700. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 700. 
 50.  John H. Blume & Stacey E. Neumann, “It’s Like Déjà Vu All Over Again:” 
Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the 
Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming) 
(describing the Strickland standard as “virtually impossible for defendants to meet”). 
 51. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 187 (1986) (rejecting an 
ineffective assistance claim alleging a failure to present mitigation material at capital 
sentencing). 
 52. 483 U.S. 776 (1987). 
 53. Id. at 795–96. 
 54. Id. at 818 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 55. Id. at 795–96 (majority opinion). 
 56. Id. at 792. 
 57. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 64 (surveying federal appellate 
decisions issued in 1987 that rejected ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
involving a failure to investigate or present mitigation evidence). 
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ineffectively investigated or presented mitigation evidence were “few 
and far between.”58
C. Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla:   The Modern Trend Toward 
Heightened Scrutiny of Mitigation Investigations 
In recent years, courts have become slightly more receptive to 
claims alleging the ineffective investigation or presentation of 
mitigation evidence—but only slightly.59  In 1987, twenty-eight 
decisions produced by the federal circuit courts addressed ineffective 
assistance claims brought by death-row habeas corpus petitioners who 
alleged that their attorneys had failed to adequately investigate or 
present mitigating evidence at their trials.60  In only two of these 
matters did the courts order new penalty trials.61 In two other cases, 
the courts ordered evidentiary hearings on the petitioners’ claims;62 
and in one other, the court espied a premature dismissal and 
remanded for further proceedings.63  In the remaining twenty-three 
 58. Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (quoting 
Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994)). 
 59. Compare Gredd, supra note 24, at 1551 (observing that “reversal of a 
conviction or sentence on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel remains 
uncommon”), with Amy R. Murphy, The Constitutional Failure of the Strickland 
Standard in Capital Cases Under the Eighth Amendment, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 
199 (2000) (“Many of the cases that have passed the Strickland test involve counsel’s 
failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence at the sentencing phase.”).  
Examples of recent federal circuit court decisions overturning death sentences due 
to ineffective investigations or presentations of mitigating evidence include:   Gray v. 
Branker, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 13317 (4th Cir. June 24, 2008); Belmontes v. Ayers, 
2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12630 (9th Cir. June 13, 2008); Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 
916 (6th Cir. 2007); Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2007); Lambright v. 
Schriro, 490 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2007); Stevens v. McBride, 489 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 
2007); Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2007); Williams v. Anderson, 
460 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2006); Correll v. Ryan, 465 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2006); Outten 
v. Kearney, 464 F.3d 401 (3d Cir. 2006); Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 
2006); Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2006); Poindexter v. Mitchell, 
454 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2006); Dickerson v. Bagley, 453 F.3d 690 (6th Cir. 2006); 
Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005); Marshall v. Cathel, 428 F.3d 452 
(3d Cir. 2005); Summerlin v. Schiriro, 427 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2005); Harries v. Bell, 
417 F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2005); Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2005).  State 
courts also have been active on this front.  See, e.g., In re Lucas, 94 P.3d 477 (Cal. 
2004) (ordering a new penalty trial due to trial counsel’s failure to investigate 
mitigating evidence); Blackwood v. State, 946 So.2d 960 (Fla. 2006) (same); Glass v. 
State, 227 S.W.3d 463 (Mo. 2007) (same); Commonwealth v. Gorby, 900 A.2d 346 
(Pa. 2006) (same); Ex Parte Gonzales, 204 S.W.3d 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) 
(same). 
 60. See infra notes 61–64 (listing all twenty-eight cases).  
 61. Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.3d 1430 (11th Cir. 1987); Magill v. Dugger, 824 
F.2d 879 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 62. Agan v. Dugger, 835 F.2d 1337 (11th Cir. 1987); Wilson v. Butler, 813 F.2d 
664 (5th Cir. 1987).  
 63. Bundy v. Wainright, 808 F.2d 1410 (11th Cir. 1987). 
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cases, the courts rejected the petitioners’ ineffective assistance 
arguments as procedurally barred or lacking in substance.64
In 2007, by comparison, the federal courts of appeals produced 
forty-two habeas decisions addressing this same subject.65  The 
petitioners’ ineffective assistance arguments were accepted in five 
cases.66  In thirty-five other decisions, the petitioners’ claims were 
rejected on the merits, or found to be procedurally barred.67  In two 
 64. Clark v. Dugger, 834 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir. 1987); Laws v. Armontrout, 834 
F.2d 1401 (8th Cir. 1987); Campbell v. Kicheloe, 829 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1987); Davis 
v. Kemp, 829 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1987); Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501 (10th 
Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156, 1169 (10th 
Cir. 2001); Bell v. Lynaugh, 828 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1987); Lightbourne v. Dugger, 
829 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1987); James v. Butler, 827 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1987); 
Mitchell v. Kemp, 827 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1987); Clanton v. Bair, 826 F.2d 1354 (4th 
Cir. 1987); Booker v. Dugger, 825 F.2d 281 (11th Cir. 1987); Elledge v. Dugger, 823 
F.2d 1439 (11th Cir. 1987); Foster v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 402 (11th Cir. 1987); Parks v. 
Brown, 840 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir. 1987), reh’g granted, 860 F.2d 1545 (10th Cir. 1988), 
rev’d sub nom. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990); Evans v. Cabana, 821 F.2d 1065 
(5th Cir. 1987); Woratzeck v. Ricketts, 820 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated and 
remanded, 486 U.S. 1051 (1988); Glass v. Butler, 820 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1987); High v. 
Kemp, 819 F.2d 988 (11th Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Cabana, 818 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 
1987); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 817 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987); Harich v. Wainwright, 813 
F.2d 1082 (11th Cir. 1987), vacated, 828 F.2d 1497; Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593 
(10th Cir. 1987); Williams v. Lynaugh, 809 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 65. See infra notes 66–68 (listing all forty-two cases). 
 66. Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 2007); Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 
F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2007); Lambright v. Schriro, 490 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Stevens v. McBride, 489 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2007); Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F.3d 
1131 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 67. Gardner v. Ozmint, 511 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2007); Perkins v. Quarterman, 
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26523 (5th Cir. 2007); Meyer v. Branker, 506 F.3d 358 (4th 
Cir. 2007); Moses v. Branker, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 24750 (4th Cir. Oct. 23, 2007); 
Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416 (3d Cir. 2007); Brown v. Ornoski, 503 F.3d 1006 (9th 
Cir. 2007); Bower v. Quarterman, 497 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2007); Reynolds v. Bagley, 
498 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2007); Coble v. Quarterman, 496 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2007); 
Getsy v. Mitchell, 495 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Hartman v. Bagley, 492 
F.3d 347 (6th Cir. 2007); Diaz v. Quarterman, 239 F. App’x 886 (5th Cir. 2007); 
Jennings v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2007); Simpson v. Norris, 490 F.3d 
1029 (8th Cir. 2007); Henry v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Corr., 490 F.3d 835 (11th Cir. 2007); 
Wood v. Quarterman, 491 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 2007); Gaskin v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Corr., 
494 F.3d 997 (11th Cir. 2007); Cone v. Bell, 492 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2007); Dill v. 
Allen, 488 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2007); Durr v. Mitchell, 487 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2007); 
Foley v. Parker, 488 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2007); Henley v. Bell, 487 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. 
2007); Young v. Sirmons, 486 F.3d 655 (10th Cir. 2007); Hill v. Polk, 230 F. App’x 
285 (4th Cir. 2007); Johnson v. Quarterman, 483 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2007); Nields v. 
Bradshaw, 482 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2007); Wilkinson v. Polk, No. 06-3, 2007 WL 
1051436, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 5, 2007); Martinez v. Quarterman, 481 F.3d 249 (5th 
Cir. 2007); Gilliam v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Corr., 480 F.3d 1027 (11th Cir. 2007); 
Skillicorn v. Luebbers, 475 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 2007); McNeill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206 
(4th Cir. 2007); Stewart v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Corr., 476 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2007); 
Emmett v. Kelly, 474 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2007); Sonnier v. Quarterman, 476 F.3d 349 
(5th Cir. 2007); Ringo v. Roper, 472 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 2007).  Omitted from this 
list are decisions rejecting failure-to-investigate arguments aimed principally at 
performance at the guilt phase of trial.  E.g., Cummings v. Sirmons, 506 F.3d 1211 
(10th Cir. 2007); Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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cases, the ineffective assistance issue was remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings.68  And so, in 1987 petitioners went 2-
23-3 in the federal courts of appeals with their claims alleging an 
ineffective investigation or presentation of mitigation evidence.  In 
2007, the scorecard read 5-35-2—an improvement, but hardly a 
marked one. 
The marginally greater success rate for these claims owes, in part, 
to three recent Supreme Court decisions.69  Each of these decisions 
overturned death sentences issued after deficient mitigation 
investigations by counsel.  These decisions all applied the Strickland 
framework for ascertaining deficient performance and resulting 
prejudice, but manifested a more receptive attitude toward ineffective 
investigation claims than earlier caselaw had evinced. 
In the first of these decisions, Williams v. Taylor,70 the Court found a 
habeas petitioner’s trial counsel prejudicially ineffective because the 
attorney had committed a series of errors:  he had failed to uncover 
records that “graphically describ[ed] [the petitioner’s] nightmarish 
childhood” and detailed the good deeds the petitioner had 
performed while in prison, he had not introduced available evidence 
 68. Ruiz v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2007); Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 
1029 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 69. See Cawley, supra note 21, at 1185 (“In recent decisions regarding capital 
defendants’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court has shown a 
tendency toward modifying Strickland and imposing stricter standards on capital 
defense lawyers. . . .”).  The enhanced scrutiny of mitigation investigations also owes 
in part to the acceptance of ABA guidelines for the performance of capital attorneys 
as an aid in determining what amounts to reasonable performance.  ABA GUIDELINES 
FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY 
CASES 76, 76 (rev. ed. 2003) [hereinafter REVISED ABA GUIDELINES].  The revised 
guidelines, issued in 2003, spell out the investigatory obligations of capital counsel in 
some detail.  Id.  Revised Guideline 10.7 specifies that defense attorneys must 
“conduct thorough and independent investigations relating to the issues of both 
guilt and penalty.”  Id.  The commentary to this guideline states that counsel should 
investigate topics including, but not limited to, the defendant’s medical history, 
family and social history, educational history, military service, employment and 
training history, and prior adult and juvenile correctional experience.  Id. at 81–82.  
In conducting this investigation, “[i]t is necessary to locate and interview the client’s 
family members . . . and virtually everyone else who knew the client and his family,” 
and to obtain, to the extent they exist and are available, various documents that 
might support mitigation arguments or provide additional leads.  Id. at 83.  These 
documents include the defendant’s school records, social service and welfare 
records, juvenile dependency or family court records, medical records, military 
records, employment records, criminal and correctional records, family birth, 
marriage, and death records, alcohol and drug abuse assessment or treatment 
records, and INS records.  Id.  Several courts have relied upon these guidelines in 
making findings of ineffectiveness.  See, e.g., Dickerson v. Bagley, 453 F.3d 690, 693 
(6th Cir. 2006) (“[C]ounsel for defendants in capital cases must fully comply with 
these professional norms.”).  See generally Blume & Neumann, supra note 50 
(discussing the adoption of the ABA guidelines as a tool for assessing whether 
counsel rendered effective assistance).  
 70. 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
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that the petitioner was borderline mentally retarded, and he had not 
followed up on other leads that might have yielded additional 
mitigating material.71  Unlike Strickland, the Williams Court did not 
attempt to justify counsel’s performance on the ground that an 
alternative mitigation argument (focusing upon the petitioner’s 
confession, apparent remorse, and cooperation with law 
enforcement) had been presented at trial.72  Instead, the Court 
determined that the failure to develop and present the missing 
mitigation evidence “was not justified by a tactical decision” to focus 
upon different issues at sentencing.73  And because the additional 
material “might well have influenced the jury’s appraisal of [the] 
petitioner’s moral culpability,” a finding of prejudice followed.74
Wiggins v. Smith,75 the second decision in the failure-to-investigate 
trilogy, was issued in 2003.  The defense attorneys in Wiggins had, at 
the time of trial, access to a report that cursorily mentioned their 
client’s “misery as a youth,” much of which was spent in the foster 
care system.76  Notwithstanding this lead, counsel did not press their 
investigation into the petitioner’s life history beyond recovering 
records discussing his foster-care placements, which revealed only 
that his mother was a chronic alcoholic who had abandoned the 
family at least once; that the petitioner had frequent, lengthy 
absences from school; and that the petitioner was “shuttled from 
foster home to foster home,” displaying “some emotional difficulties” 
in the process.77  The defense presentation at sentencing was 
accordingly modest, offering only what the Court later described as a 
“halfhearted mitigation case” that resulted in a death sentence.78
Much more useful evidence was available, if only the defense 
attorneys had pushed their investigation further.  A social history 
report prepared in connection with post-conviction proceedings 
detailed extensive physical and sexual abuse that the petitioner had 
suffered as a child.79  The Wiggins Court concluded that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to uncover this information.80  “In assessing the 
reasonableness of an attorney’s investigation,” the Court observed en 
route to reaching this conclusion, “a court must consider not only the 
 71. Id. at 395–96. 
 72. Id. at 396. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 76. Id. at 523. 
 77. Id. at 525. 
 78. Id. at 526. 
 79. Id. at 516–17. 
 80. Id. at 525–26. 
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quantum of evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the 
known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate 
further.”81  Finding that the records already obtained by the 
petitioner’s trial attorneys bespoke a need for further investigation, 
the Court said that by failing to undertake this additional effort, 
“counsel chose to abandon their investigation at an unreasonable 
juncture, making a fully informed decision with respect to sentencing 
strategy impossible.”82  As for prejudice, the Court stressed that the 
undeveloped mitigating evidence was not “mutually exclusive” with 
the sentencing strategy that had been embraced by defense 
counsel—arguing that the petitioner had no prior record and was not 
directly responsible for the murder at issue—and determined that 
had the petitioner’s jury heard this “powerful” mitigating evidence, a 
reasonable probability existed that it would not have returned a 
death sentence.83
The final chapter in the trilogy, Rompilla v. Beard,84 was written in 
2005.  In Rompilla, counsel failed to conduct a timely review of court 
records concerning the petitioner’s prior convictions for rape, 
burglary, and theft, even though these offenses were part of the 
prosecution’s case in aggravation.85  These records indicated that the 
petitioner had experienced an economically deprived childhood in 
which, among other hardships, he had been beaten by his father and 
locked in an excrement-filled dog pen with his brother.86  If these and 
other records had been placed the hands of experts, they could have 
supported mitigation arguments that the petitioner suffered from 
fetal alcohol syndrome and schizophrenia.87  The information 
contained in the court records also could have led counsel to other 
sources of mitigation material, such as school records indicating that 
the petitioner’s IQ was within the mentally retarded range.88  
Consistent with Williams and Wiggins, the Rompilla court concluded 
that counsel’s failure to obtain these records amounted to prejudicial 
error.89  Quoting Strickland, the Court held that the absence of this 
mitigation evidence at the petitioner’s trial was “‘sufficient to 
 81. Id. at 527. 
 82. Id. at 527–28. 
 83. Id. at 536. 
 84. 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
 85. Id. at 384–85. 
 86. Id. at 390–92. 
 87. Id. at 391–92. 
 88. Id. at 393. 
 89. Id. at 389–90. 
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undermine confidence in the outcome’ actually reached at 
sentencing.”90
D. The Present State of Ineffective Assistance Law as It Relates to Failures to 
Investigate and Present Mitigation Evidence 
Strickland, Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla all endorse and 
implement a “case-by-case approach to determining whether an 
attorney’s performance was unconstitutionally deficient.”91  Inevitably, 
however, some generic principles have emerged from the burgeoning 
caselaw addressing claims alleging a failure to investigate or present 
mitigation evidence. 
Several of these guidelines relate to the duty to investigate.  In 
preparing for the penalty phase, counsel must undertake a 
“reasonable” investigation into mitigation material.92  A “reasonable” 
investigation is “thorough and complete,”93 encompassing efforts to 
locate all “reasonably available mitigating evidence,”94 but at the same 
time, counsel need not “‘pursue every path until it bears fruit or until 
all hope withers.’”95  This means that counsel (or their agents) need 
not interview every conceivable witness,96 particularly those who can 
be located only with grave difficulty.97  To safeguard against a 
 90. Id. at 393 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). 
 91. Id. at 394 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 92. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; see Stewart v. Dep’t of Corr., 476 F.3d 1193, 1209 
(11th Cir. 2007) (“In considering claims that counsel was ineffective at the penalty 
phase of trial, we determine ‘whether counsel reasonably investigated possible 
mitigating factors and made a reasonable effort to present mitigating evidence to the 
sentencing court.’”) (quoting Henyard v. McDonough, 459 F.3d 1217, 1242 (11th 
Cir. 2006)); Lambrix v. Singletary, 72 F.3d 1500, 1506 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Counsel 
cannot be held responsible for failing to find mitigating evidence if, after a 
reasonable investigation, nothing has put the counsel on notice of the existence of 
that evidence.”). 
 93. Dickerson v. Bagley, 453 F.3d 690, 693 (6th Cir. 2006).  A recurring issue on 
this front concerns whether counsel has an affirmative duty to ask a defendant 
whether he or she had been abused as a child.  Compare Simon v. State, 857 So. 2d 
668, 685 (Miss. 2003) (finding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to ask his 
client whether he had been abused as a child), with Ex parte Gonzales, 204 S.W.3d 
391, 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (finding counsel ineffective for failing to ask his 
client whether he had been abused as a child). 
 94. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (quoting ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE 
APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 93 
(1989)). 
 95. Williams v. Head, 185 F.3d 1223, 1236–37 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Foster v. 
Dugger, 823 F.2d 402, 405 (11th Cir. 1987)). 
 96. Young v. Sirmons, 486 F.3d 655, 680 (10th Cir. 2007); Gilbert v. Moore, 134 
F.3d 642, 655 (4th Cir. 1998); see Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533 (noting that counsel need 
not “investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely 
the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing”). 
 97. See In re Thomas, 129 P.3d 49, 61 (Cal. 2006) (declining to find counsel 
ineffective for failing to locate certain witnesses whose identities could only be 
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subsequent finding of ineffectiveness, however, counsel should 
undertake 
inquiries into social background and evidence of family abuse, 
potential mental impairment, physical health history, [any] history 
of drug and alcohol abuse, . . . [an] examination of mental and 
physical health records, school records, and criminal records . . . 
[and a] review [of] all evidence that the prosecution plans to 
introduce in the penalty phase proceedings, including the records 
pertaining to criminal history and prior convictions.98
Because of the substantial mitigating weight accorded to evidence of 
severe psychological problems, mental defects, and childhood abuse, 
the modern caselaw exhibits especially little patience for attorneys 
who fail to conduct at least a basic inquiry into these topics.99
This initial investigation will produce some evident leads and some 
dead ends.  It is expected that counsel will dedicate their limited time 
and resources to the more promising veins of mitigation material.  A 
failure to push auspicious leads will be condemned,100 but an attorney 
normally will not be faulted for diverting time and attention away 
from what reasonably seem to be unfruitful avenues of inquiry.101  The 
gleaned through painstaking investigation, though counsel was found ineffective for 
failing to locate other, more easily found individuals). 
 98. Correll v. Ryan, 465 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Summerlin v. 
Schriro, 427 F.3d 623, 630 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)).  But cf. Chandler v. United 
States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (maintaining that “no 
absolute duty exists to investigate particular facts or a certain line of defense”); 
Clanton v. Bair, 826 F.2d 1354, 1358 (4th Cir. 1987) (“There is no constitutional 
basis for a rule that would require a psychiatric evaluation in every capital case.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 716–19 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding 
counsel prejudicially ineffective for failing to uncover evidence of the petitioner’s 
troubled childhood and brain impairment); Lambright v. Schriro, 490 F.3d 1103, 
1127–28 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding prejudicially deficient a penalty-phase investigation 
that overlooked the petitioner’s mental health problems, drug dependency, and 
childhood abuse); Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F.3d 1131, 1143–45 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(assigning prejudicial error to a failure by counsel to locate evidence that the 
petitioner was physically abused as child, had brain damage and a low IQ, and 
abused drugs and alcohol). 
 100. See, e.g., Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527–28 (criticizing the decision of counsel not to 
expand their investigation of petitioner’s life history beyond a review of social 
services records); Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(faulting trial counsel for failing to follow up on leads suggesting that the petitioner 
suffered from mental illness). 
 101. See McWee v. Weldon, 283 F.3d 179, 188 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he 
reasonableness of an investigation, or a decision by counsel that forecloses the need 
for an investigation, must be considered in light of the scarcity of counsel’s time and 
resources in preparing for a sentencing hearing and the reality that counsel must 
concentrate his efforts on the strongest arguments in favor of mitigation.”).  In 
prioritizing their work, attorneys are entitled to rely on uncontroverted information 
provided by their clients.  “[W]hen a defendant has given counsel reason to believe 
that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel’s 
failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable.”  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984); see also Emmett v. Kelly, 474 F.3d 
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latter rule holds true even if subsequent investigation yields 
mitigating evidence on points that had been abandoned by trial 
counsel.102  And so, if a mental health expert or experts consulted in 
the course of the mitigation investigation return unambiguously 
unhelpful opinions with no useful leads, counsel has no obligation to 
continue to consult additional experts on the same issue, in the hope 
that one will adopt a contrary view.103  Likewise, counsel can decline 
to pursue leads further upon reasonably becoming convinced that 
the mitigation evidence in question has a “double edge” to it, 
meaning an inherent capacity for aggravation as well as mitigation.104
154, 168 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that counsel could rely on the client’s denials of 
abuse); Moody v. Polk, 408 F.3d 141, 148–50 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding counsel’s 
decision not to hold further meetings with the client reasonable because the client 
had lied and refused to give any productive leads). 
 102. This rule follows from the principle that with an ineffective assistance claim, 
the focus lies on what would have been found and produced with a reasonable effort, 
not on what may have been found and produced through an exemplary effort.  This 
principle informed the following discussion of the limits of the ineffective assistance 
inquiry: 
It is common practice for petitioners attacking their death sentences to 
submit affidavits from witnesses who say they could have supplied additional 
mitigating circumstance evidence, had they been called, or . . . had they 
been asked the right questions. . . . But the existence of such affidavits, 
artfully drafted though they may be, usually proves little of significance. . . . 
That other witnesses could have been called or other testimony elicited 
usually proves at most the wholly unremarkable fact that with the luxury of 
time and the opportunity to focus resources on specific parts of a made 
record, post-conviction counsel will inevitably identify shortcomings in the 
performance of prior counsel. 
Grossman v. McDonough, 466 F.3d 1325, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Waters v. 
Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1513–14 (11th Cir. 1995)). 
 103. See Byram v. Ozmint, 339 F.3d 203, 210 (4th Cir. 2003) (“A failure to ‘shop 
around’ for a favorable expert opinion after an evaluation yields little in mitigating 
evidence does not constitute ineffective assistance.”) (quoting Poyner v. Murray, 964 
F.2d 1404, 1419 (4th Cir. 1992)); Walls v. Bowersox, 151 F.3d 827, 835 (8th Cir. 
1998) (finding that it was reasonable for counsel to rely on the conclusions of two 
trained psychiatrists that no additional testing of the petitioner was warranted); 
Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 447 (Ky. 2001) (concluding that counsel 
was not ineffective for relying on an expert opinion that the defendant had no 
significant neurological deficit); Ringo v. State, 120 S.W.3d 743, 749 (Mo. 2003) 
(observing that “where trial counsel has . . . made reasonable efforts to investigate 
the mental status of defendant and has concluded that there is no basis in pursuing a 
particular line of defense, counsel should not be held ineffective for not shopping 
for another expert to testify in a particular way”); State v. Frogge, 607 S.E.2d 627, 636 
(N.C. 2005) (stating that counsel was not required to second-guess a mental health 
report). 
 104. See Martinez v. Quarterman, 481 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding 
reasonable counsel’s decision not to further pursue evidence in mitigation, on the 
ground that known facts suggested this evidence would be a double-edged sword); 
Rector v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 551, 564 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[A] tactical decision not to 
pursue and present potentially mitigating evidence on the grounds that it is double-
edged in nature is objectively reasonable, and therefore does not amount to deficient 
performance.”). 
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Once counsel becomes aware of the available mitigation evidence, 
substantial deference will adhere to his or her decisions regarding 
the presentation of this material at trial.105  There is no absolute 
requirement that a defense attorney actually introduce any mitigation 
evidence at the penalty phase.106  A fortiori, attorneys are not required 
to present all mitigation evidence of which they are aware.107  Counsel 
can decline to present even powerful mitigation evidence if a valid 
strategic reason supports this decision.  These reasons include an 
awareness that the evidence would compromise, contradict, or dilute 
another reasonable mitigation strategy;108 well-grounded concerns 
that the evidence could be construed as aggravating as well as 
mitigating;109 or a reasonable sense that the evidence would open the 
door to powerful rebuttal material from the prosecution.110  Finally, it 
almost goes without saying that counsel need not call witnesses whose 
testimony would be cumulative of other evidence placed before the 
 105. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (1984) (“[S]trategic choices made after 
thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 
unchallengeable.”). 
 106. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 (2003); see Commonwealth v. Moore, 860 
A.2d 88, 98 (Pa. 2004) (“It is well settled that failure to present mitigation evidence, 
without more, is not ineffective assistance per se.”). 
 107. Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1319 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 108. See, e.g., Young v. Sirmons, 486 F.3d 655, 682 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding it 
reasonable for the petitioner’s trial counsel to frame his penalty-phase presentation 
around the theory that the petitioner was not a bad person, as opposed someone 
who may be violent but has reduced culpability due to his background and 
circumstances); Stewart v. Dep’t of Corr., 476 F.3d 1193, 1218 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(finding defense counsel’s decision not to present evidence of the petitioner’s 
substance abuse reasonable because, inter alia, the evidence would have undermined 
the defense strategy of portraying childhood abuse as a “trigger point to violence”); 
Ringo v. Roper, 472 F.3d 1001, 1006–07 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting that counsel 
reasonably decided not to call a childhood development specialist to speak to the 
violence and neglect petitioner suffered during his childhood, as this would have 
conflicted with the coherent mitigation theme advanced by the petitioner’s mother’s 
testimony at the penalty phase); Haliburton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Corr., 342 F.3d 1233, 
1243–44 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Counsel is not ‘required to present all mitigation 
evidence, even if the additional mitigation evidence would not have been 
incompatible with counsel’s strategy.’  Counsel must be permitted to weed out some 
arguments to stress others and advocate effectively.” (quoting Chandler, 218 F.3d at 
1319)). 
 109. E.g., Hartman v. Bagley, 492 F.3d 347, 360–61 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding 
counsel’s decision not to present a psychologist’s report to be reasonable because the 
report contained damaging facts and counsel placed useful facts into the record 
through other witnesses). 
 110. E.g., Lovitt v. True, 403 F.3d 171, 180 (4th Cir. 2005); Carter v. Mitchell, 443 
F.3d 517, 531–32 (6th Cir. 2001); Gaskin v. State, 822 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Fla. 2002) 
(“Trial counsel will not be held to be deficient when she makes a reasonable strategic 
decision to not present mental mitigation testimony during the penalty phase 
because it could open the door to other damaging testimony.”); Haliburton v. 
Singletary, 691 So. 2d 466, 471 (Fla. 1997). 
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trier of fact.111  In short, courts rarely second-guess informed decisions 
by counsel regarding what facts, within the universe of available 
evidence, should be presented at the penalty phase of a capital trial.112
Turning to the law surrounding Strickland’s prejudice prong, to 
assess the harm done by an unreasonable failure to investigate or 
present mitigating evidence, courts reweigh the evidence in 
aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence.113  
The presence or absence of overwhelming aggravating evidence is an 
important part of this analysis,114 but whether prejudice will be found 
typically depends more on the quality of the mitigating evidence that 
counsel inexplicably failed to discover or present.115  Here, the 
burden lies on the defendant or petitioner to show what a reasonable 
investigation would have yielded.116  If it can be shown that counsel 
 111. E.g., Broom v. Mitchell, 441 F.3d 392, 410 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that it is 
not constitutionally necessary to present additional mitigating evidence that is merely 
cumulative of that already presented); Van Poyck v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 290 F.3d 
1318, 1324 n.7 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that “a petitioner cannot establish ineffective 
assistance by identifying additional evidence that could have been presented when 
that evidence is merely cumulative”); Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206, 1239–40 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (observing that it is not unreasonable for counsel not to call additional 
witnesses whose testimony would be virtually the same as that of witnesses who had 
already testified). 
 112. Courts sometimes supply their own strategic rationales for such decisions in 
situations where the attorney offers none.  See Gilliam v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Corr., 480 
F.3d 1027, 1034 (11th Cir. 2007) (“That defense counsel has refused to characterize 
the decision as strategic is not dispositive” of the ineffective assistance inquiry); 
Alderman v. Terry, 468 F.3d 775, 795 (11th Cir. 2006) (supplying a strategic rationale 
for an attorney who candidly admitted he could not recall one); Harich v. Dugger, 
844 F.2d 1464, 1470 (11th Cir. 1988) (assuming that the petitioner’s attorneys were 
not fully aware of the scope of permissible mitigating evidence, petitioner would 
need to show that the approach they ultimately took “would not have been used by 
professionally competent counsel”). 
 113. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003). 
 114. See Knight v. Quarterman, No. 04-70042, 2006 WL 1793586, at *16 (5th Cir. 
June 30, 2006) (finding no prejudice even if ineffective assistance was assumed; the 
crimes were “so horrible and cruel that it is extremely unlikely that a reasonable 
juror would have been willing to spare [the petitioner’s] life, even if presented with 
[additional mitigating] evidence”); Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 1228–29 
(11th Cir. 2001) (discussing how the aggravating circumstances of some murders will 
render harmless a failure to investigate or present mitigation evidence); Simon v. 
State, 857 So. 2d 668, 685 (Miss. 2003) (concluding that the heinous nature of the 
capital crimes at issue ruled out any prejudice to the petitioner, even if ineffective 
assistance had been shown); Taylor v. State, 156 P.3d 739, 755–56 (Utah 2007) 
(determining that even if evidence of the petitioner’s “moderate” brain damage 
been identified and placed before the jury, it would not have affected the verdict 
because of the “horrendous circumstances” of the crime). 
 115. See Lambright v. Schriro, 490 F.3d 1103, 1127 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing 
previous cases in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
found prejudice for failing to investigate or present mitigation evidence 
notwithstanding “horrible” or “horrific” crimes). 
 116. See Carter v. Mitchell, 443 F.3d 517, 529 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing how 
ineffective assistance claims have been rejected in cases where the petitioner failed to 
show what would have been found through a reasonable investigation). 
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inexcusably overlooked or failed to develop evidence that the 
defendant experienced severe childhood deprivation or abuse117 or 
suffered from significant mental disease or defects,118 modern courts 
often follow Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla and hold that the 
omission justifies retrial of the penalty phase.119  An unreasonable 
failure to locate or present other types of mitigating material also may 
undermine a death sentence, but far less frequently.  Examples of this 
less potent, but still significant, evidence include indicia of the 
defendant or petitioner’s drug or alcohol problems;120 childhood 
hardship not involving physical or sexual abuse;121 and character 
evidence from friends, acquaintances, or family members.122  Of 
course, a given case often involves multiple types of missing 
mitigation evidence,123 and a failure to locate or put on more than 
 117. E.g., Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1176 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding counsel 
ineffective for failing to investigate adequately or introduce evidence of childhood 
physical and sexual abuse); Lewis v. Dretke, 355 F.3d 364, 367–69 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(per curiam) (finding counsel deficient for failing to investigate the petitioner’s 
childhood abuse); Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 490–91 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(finding counsel ineffective for failing to investigate evidence of abuse); Coleman v. 
Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 452 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding counsel ineffective for failing to 
investigate abuse in preparation for the penalty phase of trial).  
 118. E.g., Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding 
counsel ineffective for failing to pursue evidence that the petitioner suffered from a 
mental disorder); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1067 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(condemning a failure to investigate and present any mitigating evidence at the 
sentencing stage, including evidence of severe psychiatric illnesses).  Of course, some 
mental illnesses or impairments will be accorded little to no mitigating weight.  For 
instance, while some courts regard a diagnosis of antisocial personality order as 
potentially mitigating, e.g., Lambright, 490 F.3d at 1122 (noting that the Arizona 
Supreme Court has held that an antisocial personality disorder is a mitigating 
factor), others do not, e.g., Willacy v. State, 967 So. 2d 131, 144 (Fla. 2007) 
(determining that counsel was not ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of 
defendant’s antisocial personality disorder). 
 119. E.g., Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing the 
petitioner’s death sentence because counsel failed to investigate and introduce 
evidence of the petitioner’s social background and mental health); Silva v. 
Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 846 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing the petitioner’s death 
sentence because counsel failed to investigate the petitioner’s past for any mental 
defenses related to psychiatric disorders or substance abuse); Coleman, 268 F.3d at 
449–53 (reversing the petitioner’s death sentence because counsel failed to 
investigate adequately the petitioner’s personal history). 
 120. E.g., Correll v. Ryan, 465 F.3d 1006, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2006) (according 
mitigating weight to the petitioner’s long history of drug use). 
 121. E.g., Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916, 931–34 (6th Cir. 2007) (according 
significant mitigating weight to the petitioner’s difficult childhood, including familial 
alcoholism). 
 122. E.g., Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 928–32 (9th Cir. 2001) (assigning 
prejudice to ineffective assistance that included a failure to locate witnesses who 
could have testified to the petitioner’s positive traits); In re Marques, 822 P.2d 435, 
450 (Cal. 1992) (same). 
 123. E.g., Outten v. Kearney, 464 F.3d 401, 419–20 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding 
prejudicial a failure to locate evidence that the petitioner suffered from physical 
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one category of mitigation material may be more prejudicial than a 
lapse involving only one subject.  The weighing process used to 
ascertain prejudice also addresses whether the beneficial effects of 
the bypassed mitigation material would have been offset or 
minimized by other evidence.  Here, courts consider several of the 
same factors that bear upon the reasonableness of a decision to 
truncate an ongoing investigation, or not to present mitigation 
evidence that counsel has discovered.  These considerations include 
whether the evidence carries a “double edge,” whether it would incite 
damaging rebuttal from the prosecution, and whether it overlaps with 
other mitigation evidence that was put before the sentencer.124   
As the text above suggests, an important difference exists between 
ineffective assistance claims alleging a failure to investigate mitigation 
evidence and claims alleging a failure to present this evidence at trial.  
With regard to the first type of claim, the caselaw has more precisely 
specified what sorts of missteps constitute ineffective performance, 
incapable of strategic justification.  Also, with a “failure to investigate” 
claim, the conventional analysis downplays the coherence of the 
mitigation arguments that were actually made at trial.125  These 
arguments will be treated as the fundamentally compromised 
products of an inadequate investigation.126  At least where there are 
no palpable tensions between the new mitigation evidence and that 
which was presented at trial, the prejudice inquiry will simply weigh 
the totality of mitigating facts against the sum of aggravating facts, 
with little attention being paid to whether counsel might have 
decided to jettison some of the newfound mitigation material in favor 
abuse, sexual abuse, neurological damage, a low IQ, learning disabilities, placement 
in foster homes, and substance abuse). 
 124. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 699-700 (1984) (observing that the 
mitigation evidence cited by the petitioner would have opened the door to damaging 
rebuttal material had it been presented at sentencing); Brooks v. Bagley, 513 F.3d 
618, 629 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that the strategy the petitioner claimed should have 
been pursued carried a “double edge” that weakened its potential for mitigation); 
Broom v. Mitchell, 441 F.3d 392, 410 (6th Cir. 2006) (reciting that a failure to 
introduce mitigating evidence that is merely cumulative of other material that was 
put on at trial does not amount to a violation of a constitutional right). 
 125. See, e.g., Poindexter v. Mitchell, 454 F.3d 564, 581 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(discounting the mitigation strategy actually used at trial because “any mitigation 
strategy to portray [the petitioner] as a peaceful person was unreasonable since that 
strategy was the product of an incomplete investigation”).  
 126. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 536 (2003) (disputing the dissent’s 
argument that the defense would have employed the same strategy even had it 
known of the undiscovered mitigation material, on the ground that “counsel were 
not in a position to make a reasonable strategic choice as to whether to focus on [the 
petitioner’s] direct responsibility, the sordid details of his life history, or both, 
because the investigation supporting their choice was unreasonable”). 
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of a more streamlined presentation.127  Furthermore, while the 
prejudice determination in a “failure to investigate” case will consider 
whether the overlooked mitigation evidence could have hurt as well 
as helped the defense,128 if the defendant or petitioner establishes 
that trial counsel stopped his or her investigation before becoming 
sufficiently aware of both the good and the bad aspects of this 
evidence, the damaging components of the undiscovered material 
normally will not influence the threshold inquiry into the 
reasonableness of counsel’s conduct.129
By contrast, with a claim alleging that counsel failed to present 
mitigation evidence of which he or she was aware, considerations 
such as the dual aggravating and mitigating nature of the evidence in 
question, the chance that it would have opened the door to 
devastating rebuttal, and the consistency of this information with the 
strategy adopted by the defense at trial all bear upon both the 
prejudice inquiry and the issue of whether counsel acted 
reasonably.130  Moreover, with a “failure to present” challenge, the 
question is not whether the downside of the mitigation evidence in 
fact outweighs its useful attributes, but whether a reasonable attorney 
could have concluded that the evidence was more trouble than it was 
 127. See, e.g., Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 493 (6th Cir. 2003) (engaging in 
a simple reweighing process of the aggravating and mitigating facts to ascertain 
prejudice); Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002) (suggesting it 
would have been possible to combine the defense strategy employed at the penalty 
phase with additional mitigation material that counsel failed to discover).  
 128. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700 (concluding that the evidence that the 
respondent said his counsel should have offered would have opened the door to 
additional aggravating facts); Emmett v. Kelly, 474 F.3d 154, 170–71 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(rejecting the petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim because, inter alia, his 
mitigation evidence would have been offset by related aggravating facts). 
 129. In other words, counsel cannot merely speculate that a potential line of 
mitigation will have a double edge, or otherwise not help the defense, and decline to 
conduct any investigation at all on that basis.  See, e.g., Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843, 
849 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding a defense attorney ineffective for failing to investigate 
mitigation evidence “because he did not think that it would do any good”).  That 
said, as discussed earlier, counsel may decide to halt an ongoing investigation upon 
reasonably becoming convinced that that the evidence in question has a double 
edge, or would open the door to damning aggravating facts.  See, e.g., St. Aubin v. 
Quarterman, 470 F.3d 1096, 1101–02 (5th Cir. 2006) (regarding as reasonable trial 
counsel’s decision to stop pursuing psychological evidence after the review already 
undertaken suggested that this evidence had an aggravating tone to it). 
 130. See, e.g., Winfield v. Roper, 460 F.3d 1026, 1033 (8th Cir. 2006) (regarding 
counsel’s decision not to call certain mitigation witnesses as reasonable because their 
testimony would have been cumulative to similar evidence that already had been 
presented); Moore v. Parker, 425 F.3d 250, 254 (6th Cir. 2005) (observing that due 
to the mixed nature of the testimony that counsel did not proffer at the penalty 
phase, the failure to introduce this material “was not even deficient performance, let 
alone prejudicial”). 
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worth.131  In other words, if the defendant or petitioner alleges a total 
or near-total failure to investigate mitigation evidence, the potential 
drawbacks of the undiscovered evidence are minimized132 and only 
bear upon the question of prejudice;133 if the defendant or petitioner 
alleges a failure to present mitigation material, the downside of this 
evidence is magnified and made central to both the threshold 
question of whether counsel was ineffective and any prejudice 
inquiry.  This difference helps explain why it is more difficult for a 
defendant or petitioner to succeed with a “failure to present” 
argument than with a “failure to investigate” challenge. 
Two other noteworthy patterns appear within the caselaw.  First, 
relatively few ineffective assistance claims involve a total failure to 
conduct a mitigation investigation.  Far more often, defendants and 
petitioners argue that their trial attorneys should have conducted a 
more thorough investigation than they did, or that counsel should 
have made different decisions about what evidence to present at the 
penalty phase.  The paucity of cases involving no investigation at all 
suggests that few of the defense attorneys who tried the cases now 
under post-conviction review appreciated an overall strategic gain 
from complete default at the penalty phase.  Second, the likelihood 
that a death sentence will be reversed due to a failure to investigate 
or present mitigation evidence varies from court to court.  Some 
federal circuits, in particular, are far more hospitable to these claims 
than are other circuits.  Among the federal circuit courts entertaining 
the lion’s share of these ineffective assistance claims (namely, the 
United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, 
and Eleventh Circuits), the Ninth Circuit has been the most 
welcoming to these arguments.134  The Sixth Circuit also has vacated 
 131. See Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002) (commenting on 
this attribute of ineffective assistance law, and noting that a reviewing court “must 
simply determine whether the course actually taken by counsel might have been 
reasonable”); Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 1225 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[E]ven 
when trial counsel’s investigation and presentation is less complete than collateral 
counsel’s, trial counsel has not performed deficiently when a reasonable lawyer could 
have decided, under the circumstances, not to investigate or present particular 
evidence.”). 
 132.  See, e.g., Correll v. Ryan, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10431, at *44 (9th Cir. May 
14, 2008) (surmising that “all of the so-called ‘damaging rebuttal evidence’” that 
might have been introduced had counsel investigated and proffered certain 
mitigation evidence “could, in the hands of a competent attorney, have been used to 
support” mitigation arguments instead). 
 133.  E.g., Whitmore v. Lockhart, 8 F.3d 614, 623-24 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding a 
failure to investigate a viable mitigating circumstance harmless because the available 
evidence also might have negatively impacted the defense case).  
 134. In this decade alone, the Ninth Circuit has overturned death sentences due 
to a failure to investigate or present mitigation evidence numerous times.  Gray v. 
Branker, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 13317 (9th Cir. June 24, 2008); Belmontes v. Ayers, 
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numerous death sentences due to failures to investigate or present 
mitigation material.135  The Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits are all 
substantially less receptive to these claims.136  In these courts, only the 
most egregious missteps by counsel have subverted a death 
sentence.137
II. POINDEXTER V. MITCHELL:   DEBATING INTENTIONAL INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE 
The discussion now turns to the Poindexter decision and its 
concurring opinions.  The pertinent facts in Poindexter were 
depressingly familiar.  Dewaine Poindexter killed a man he thought 
was his ex-girlfriend’s new boyfriend.138  Poindexter’s trial produced a 
death sentence, which was affirmed on direct appeal.139  The 
condemned man then sought habeas relief.140  Among his claims, 
Poindexter alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of 
counsel because his attorney had failed to investigate and present 
certain mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of trial.141  This 
evidence included indicia of a troubled childhood (such as the fact 
that defendant had been beaten by his mother, who had tried to kill 
2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12630 (9th Cir. June 13, 2008); Lambright v. Schriro, 490 F.3d 
1103 (9th Cir. 2007); Correll v. Ryan, 465 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2006); Frierson v. 
Woodford, 463 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2006); Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181 (9th 
Cir. 2005); Summerlin v. Schiriro, 427 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2005); Boyde v. Brown, 404 
F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2005); Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2003); Karis 
v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2002); Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 
2002); Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001); Ainsworth v. Woodford, 
268 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2001); Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 135. The Sixth Circuit has overturned death sentences due to a failure to 
investigate or present mitigation evidence on several occasions over the past few 
years. Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 2007); Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 
680 (6th Cir. 2007); Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2006); Poindexter 
v. Mitchell, 454 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2006); Dickerson v. Bagley, 453 F.3d 690 (6th Cir. 
2006); Harries v. Bell, 417 F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2005); Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 
482 (6th Cir. 2003); Frazier v. Huffman, 343 F.3d 780 (6th Cir. 2003); Coleman v. 
Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2001); Skaggs v. Parker, 235 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 136. See Blume & Neumann, supra note 50 (discussing the reception afforded to 
ineffective assistance claims in the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth 
and Fifth Circuits). 
 137. E.g., Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1067–68 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding 
ineffective assistance of counsel for a failure to investigate or present any mitigating 
evidence, despite the lengthy and significant record of mitigating circumstances); 
Lockett v. Anderson, 230 F.3d 695, 714 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding counsel ineffective 
for failing to pursue basic leads before him that put him on notice that the petitioner 
may have had mental and psychological disabilities, including “repeated head 
injuries, black-outs, delusional stories, references to self as another name, family 
troubles, drug and/or alcohol addiction”). 
 138. Poindexter, 454 F.3d at 568. 
 139. Id. at 569. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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herself and her children) and a diagnosis of paranoid personality 
disorder.142
The district court determined, and the Sixth Circuit agreed, that 
trial counsel’s failure to discover and present this evidence 
constituted ineffective assistance that prejudiced Poindexter at the 
penalty phase.143  At that stage of the proceedings, Poindexter’s trial 
attorney had tried to portray his client as deserving of mercy because 
he was essentially a quiet and gentle individual.144  The Poindexter 
panel concluded that it could not treat this presentation as an 
informed strategic choice because counsel had inadequately 
investigated the other possible arguments he could have made on 
Poindexter’s behalf.145  As for prejudice, the court of appeals 
determined that “had counsel investigated and presented a fuller and 
more accurate description of [petitioner’s] troubled childhood, and 
paranoid personality disorder, there is a reasonable probability that 
the jury would not have recommended the death sentence.”146  The 
court of appeals returned the case to the district court, with 
instructions to remand the matter to the state courts for further 
sentencing proceedings.147
Nothing about the panel opinion in Poindexter is particularly 
exceptional.  The same cannot be said about the concurring opinions 
that were issued by all three judges who heard the case.  In the first of 
these opinions, Chief Judge Danny Boggs wrote separately to “note 
the continuing oddity of the circumstances in cases such as this.”148  
Judge Boggs elaborated: 
To put it bluntly, it might well appear to a disinterested observer 
that the most incompetent and ineffective counsel that can be 
provided to a convicted and death-eligible defendant is a fully-
investigated and competent penalty-phase defense. . . .  [I]f counsel 
provides fully-effective assistance, and the jury simply does not buy 
the defense, then the defendant is likely to be executed.  However, 
if counsel provides ineffective assistance, then the prisoner is likely 
to be spared, certainly for many years, and frequently forever.149
After suggesting that some of the undiscovered mitigating evidence 
in Poindexter might not have aided the petitioner had it been 
 142. Id. at 577. 
 143. Id. at 569–70, 581. 
 144. Id. at 576. 
 145. Id. at 581. 
 146. Id. at 580. 
 147. Id. at 581. 
 148. Id. at 587 (Boggs, C.J., concurring). 
 149. Id. at 587–88. 
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presented at trial,150 Boggs returned to what he identified as the 
“moral hazard” raised by the present state of ineffective assistance law 
generally, and reversals for failing to locate and present mitigation 
evidence specifically.151  He opined: 
A somewhat prescient attorney, years ago, in the cases we are now 
seeing, might implicitly have reasoned (and any sensible attorney 
today, reading our cases, would have to be blind not to reason) as 
follows: 
If I make an all-out investigation, and analyze and present to the 
jury every possible mitigating circumstance, especially of the 
“troubled childhood” variety, it is my professional judgment that I 
may thereby increase the probability of this extremely repellant 
client escaping the death penalty from 10% to 12%.  On the other 
hand, if I present reasonably available evidence that I think has as 
good a chance as any other in securing the slim chance of mercy 
from the jury, I will have a 50-99% chance of overturning the 
extremely likely death penalty judgment 10-15 years down the road.  
I will thus have secured many additional years of life for the client, 
and he may very likely avoid capital punishment altogether.152
Judge Boggs quickly clarified that he was speaking in the abstract, 
and not accusing defense attorneys of questionable tactics.  He wrote, 
“[w]hile I do not assert that the counsel in this or any other case 
made such a judgment, either consciously or unconsciously, I do note 
that our jurisprudence has made such a line of reasoning virtually 
inevitable for any defense attorney.”153
The other two members of the Poindexter panel reacted quite 
differently to the provocative thesis offered by their Chief Judge.  In 
her own concurring opinion, Judge Martha Daughtrey condemned 
what she described as an “unjustified” and “truly disturbing” assault 
on the criminal defense bar.154  While Daughtrey did not assail the 
logic behind the Boggs concurrence, she described his opinion as “an 
affront to the dedication of the women and men who struggle 
tirelessly to uphold their ethical duty to investigate fully and present 
professionally all viable defenses to their clients.”155  Judge Daughtrey 
added that, to the extent that Boggs alleged that defense attorneys 
were successfully gaming the system, he “also silently accuses the 
 150. Id. at 588–89. 
 151. Id. at 589. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 589 (Daughtrey, J., concurring). 
 155. Id. at 590. 
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judges on this court of complicity in the alleged fraud by 
countenancing the tactics outlined.”156
Judge Richard Suhrheinrich wrote the panel opinion in Poindexter, 
but he too was moved to write separately.  Suhrheinrich agreed with 
Boggs, opining that the Chief Judge had “accurately point[ed] out 
the difficulties with the current legal doctrine concerning ineffective 
assistance of counsel in death penalty cases at the penalty phase.”157  
Suhrheinrich pointedly disagreed with Judge Daughtrey’s comments.  
He wrote that his experiences with counsel in death penalty cases 
“have been different” than hers, following this cryptic comment with 
a citation to his concurring opinion in Thompson v. Bell.158  In 
Thompson, another capital habeas case decided two years earlier, the 
petitioner’s habeas attorneys failed to draw the court of appeals’ 
notice to a deposition transcript containing key mitigating evidence 
until after the court had issued its opinion denying relief.159  The 
transcript eventually came to the court’s attention.160  After 
considering the information contained therein, the panel amended 
its earlier opinion and remanded the matter to the trial court for an 
evidentiary hearing on the claim of ineffective assistance (a decision 
ultimately reversed by the United States Supreme Court on 
procedural grounds).161  Though the two other members of the 
Thompson panel were inclined to treat counsel’s failure to timely 
utilize the transcript as an innocent oversight,162 Suhrheinrich voiced 
his suspicion that habeas counsel planned to unveil the transcript on 
the eve of the petitioner’s execution, in order to obtain a last-second 
stay.163  “[T]here may be a rational, strategic, calculated reason for 
habeas counsel’s purported negligence,”164 Suhrheinrich wrote at that 
time, calling for an evidentiary hearing to determine if counsel had 
committed fraud on the court.165  By citing to Thompson, the 
Suhrheinrich concurrence in Poindexter subtly reiterated its author’s 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 589 (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring). 
 158. Id. (citing Bell v. Thompson, 373 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 2004) (Suhrheinrich, J., 
concurring), rev’d, 545 U.S. 794 (2005)). 
 159. 373 F.3d 688, 742 (6th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 545 U.S. 794 (2005). 
 160. Id. at 689–90 (majority opinion). 
 161. Id. at 691–92; see Bell v. Thompson, 545 U.S. 794, 799–801 (2005) (discussing 
the procedural history of the case). 
 162. Thompson, 373 F.3d at 689–90. 
 163. Id. at 738 n.21 (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 742. 
  
1674 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1645 
                                                          
opinion that defense attorneys may in fact “sandbag” in their capital 
cases.166
The concurring opinions in Poindexter thus offered very different 
views regarding sandbagging by defense attorneys.  Before evaluating 
the flaws and merits of the Boggs and Suhrheinrich concurrences, it 
is important to understand precisely what Judge Boggs wrote, and to 
evaluate Judge Daughtrey’s response.  Judge Boggs suggested that 
defendants might benefit if their attorneys failed to conduct “an all-
out investigation, and analyze and present to the jury every possible 
mitigating circumstance,” and instead limited their mitigation 
presentations to “reasonably available evidence” that “has as good a 
chance as any other in securing the slim chance of mercy from the 
jury.”167  Notwithstanding his reference to “reasonably available 
evidence,” Judge Boggs evidently envisioned efforts falling short of 
the “reasonable investigation” standard announced by Strickland and 
advanced in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla.  Otherwise, there would 
be no likelihood of reversal due to ineffective assistance, and the 
sandbagging strategy that Boggs described would collapse.  At the 
same time, with its reference to the presentation of “reasonably 
available evidence,” the Boggs concurrence evidently did not 
contemplate the total absence of a mitigation case. 
Judge Daughtrey’s rebuttal, meanwhile, implied that sandbagging 
is rare, not because it doesn’t work, but because it violates an 
attorney’s duty of competence and thereby exposes counsel to 
criticism, loss of business, and even suspension or disbarment.168  The 
problem with this argument, and thus with the Daughtrey 
concurrence, is that these deterrents are of debatable efficacy.  In 
fact, even egregiously inadequate representation seldom results in 
serious professional consequences.169  While failures to investigate or 
present mitigating evidence may violate the duty of competent 
representation,170 the likelihood of lasting professional discipline for 
 166. Poindexter v. Mitchell, 454 F.3d 564, 589 (6th Cir. 2006) (Suhrheinrich, J., 
concurring). 
 167. Id. at 589 (Boggs, C.J., concurring). 
 168. See id. at 590 (Daughtrey, J., concurring) (emphasizing the “ethical duty” of 
capital defense counsel to “investigate fully and present professionally all viable 
defenses available to their clients”).
 169. See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense:   Relocating 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 700 (2007) (explaining 
why disciplinary proceedings are not an effective method of addressing poor 
performance by counsel). 
 170. See CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS’N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.1 (6th ed. 2007) (“A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, 
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”). 
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these lapses is remote.171  Furthermore, whether an ethical 
proscription against incompetent representation will deter the 
ineffective investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence may 
depend on whether sandbagging tends to benefit the client.  If these 
tactics work, a zealous defense attorney could rationalize inadequate 
effort as effective assistance, and thus not at all improper; or, at worst, 
as a personal ethical sacrifice made for the good of the client.172  A 
defense investigator recently convicted of forging documents used in 
a death-penalty habeas corpus petition believed what she did was 
justified.173  Does taking an oath to the bar necessarily render all 
defense attorneys immune to similar reasoning?174  Indeed, a 
recurring critique of capital trials concerns defense attorneys who are 
so indifferent, incompetent, or overtaxed that they seemingly must 
know that they are providing inadequate assistance, or are at least 
willfully blind to that fact.175  If this sort of deficient practice is 
expected, why isn’t intentional ineffective assistance that might save, 
rather than end, a client’s life similarly within the realm of possibility? 
III. EVALUATING THE EFFICACY OF INTENTIONAL INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE 
The real question, then, is whether a deliberate failure to 
investigate or present mitigation evidence works as a defense strategy.  
If it does, it may be necessary to formulate new deterrents to this sort 
of representation.  If it does not, then it is unlikely that this conduct 
 171. Even as attorneys often candidly admit that they rendered ineffective 
assistance in capital cases, see, e.g., Walls v. Bowersox, 151 F.3d 827, 836 (8th Cir. 
1998) (remarking upon counsel’s admission of ineffective assistance); 
Commonwealth v. Carson, 913 A.2d 220, 265 (Pa. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 384 
(2007) (describing an affidavit by counsel admitting ineffective assistance), very few 
courts refer poor-performing attorneys to the appropriate disciplinary authority.  See 
Mike Zapler, State Bar Ignores Errant Lawyers, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 12, 2006, 
at A1 (discussing the paucity of disciplinary actions against criminal defense 
attorneys in California), available at http://www.mercurynews.com/ 
ci_5136869?IADID=Search.  But see Garrison v. State, 103 P.3d 590, 619 n.56 (Okla. 
2004) (referring to the Oklahoma Bar Association an attorney who failed to 
adequately present a failure-to-investigate claim at a post-trial evidentiary hearing). 
 172. For similar reasons, while the egos and optimism of some defense attorneys 
may stand in the way of a strategy premised on intentional failure, these same 
attorneys arguably could endorse conscious errors if they knew that in losing a battle, 
they would assuredly win the war.   
 173. Louis Sahagun, Death Penalty Foe Gets Five Years, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007, at 
B1. 
 174. Published decisions document at least a few efforts by counsel to inject error 
into death penalty proceedings.  In Harding v. Lewis, 834 F.2d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 
1987), for example, counsel advised defendant to represent himself, in the hope that 
this would give rise to reversible error. 
 175. See WHITE, supra note 13, at 3–9 (2006) (criticizing the performance of 
certain capital defense attorneys); Bright, supra note 13, at 1838–39 (same). 
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poses a substantial threat to the integrity and reliability of the judicial 
process.  A decision to sandbag bespeaks, if nothing else, a certain 
cynical shrewdness on the part of the complicit counsel.  It stands to 
reason, then, that the attorneys who might be tempted to sandbag are 
savvy enough to reject this strategy if it does not work.  So again, the 
question is, does it?  
In assessing the pros and cons of intentionally ineffective 
mitigation efforts by counsel, one must acknowledge at the outset 
that if this strategy will reliably secure the reversal of a death 
sentence, it offers several benefits to the defense.  Most obviously, a 
defendant whose death sentence is vacated will not be executed 
unless and until another penalty jury issues another death verdict.  
This may not happen:   The prosecution may decide not to seek the 
death penalty a second time, the second jury may be more 
sympathetic to the defendant than was the first, the defense may put 
on a better penalty-phase presentation at retrial, or the prosecution 
may put on a worse case, whether because of lost evidence or 
otherwise.176  And even if these proceedings result in yet another 
death sentence, the defense still will have bought more time and 
another round of appeals. 
Arrayed against these apparent advantages are a number of 
potential drawbacks.  Conventional wisdom regarding sandbagging 
can be summarized as follows:   It doesn’t work, so don’t try it.177  The 
orthodox view long has held that the risks of sandbagging outweigh 
the benefits because, among other reasons, (1) the client may be 
incapable of presenting the withheld claim in later proceedings, 
especially if he or she has no right to counsel in those proceedings; 
(2) there is always a risk that post-conviction counsel may overlook a 
meritorious claim; (3) the defendant typically will remain 
 176. See David McCord, Switching Juries in Midstream:   The Perplexities of Penalty-
Phase-Only Retrials, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 215, 221, 243–44 (2004–2005) (discussing 
the defendant’s possible advantages at retrial of the penalty phase).  A chart in the 
technical appendix to the report of Former Governor Ryan’s Commission on Capital 
Punishment that details the status of all death-penalty cases decided in Illinois state 
courts between 1977 and 2001 reveals that in a substantial number of cases where a 
death sentence was overturned, the defendant was not re-sentenced to death.  
COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT tbl. 13 (2002), http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/ 
techinical_appendix/section_2/table_13.pdf. 
 177. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 n.7 (1986) (describing the 
drawbacks of sandbagging); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 46 n.9 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(observing that sandbagging is “not only unethical, but usually bad strategy as well”); 
see also supra note 10 and accompanying text (listing a number of sources making the 
point that lawyers would rarely give up a meritorious claim on the off chance they 
could gain a future habeas claim).  But see Hughes, supra note 8, at 337 (“It must be 
conceded, however, that sandbagging cannot be entirely ruled out.”). 
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incarcerated until the withheld claim is presented to, and ruled upon 
by, the courts; (4) “any strategy of withholding would fail if detected”; 
and, perhaps most important, (5) reviewing courts may reject claims 
that would have prevailed if presented to the trial court.178
These critiques have been directed principally at a particular type 
of sandbagging, namely, deliberate failures by defense attorneys to 
raise timely objections at trial.  Some of these arguments lose their 
force when applied to the conscious failure to investigate or present 
mitigating evidence.  Individuals sentenced to death typically receive 
appointed counsel to assist with direct appeals and at least one 
habeas corpus petition.179  The fact that the defendant will remain 
incarcerated while post-trial proceedings are pending is not 
necessarily a bad thing if the alternative is execution, rather than 
freedom.  As for the assertion that “any strategy of withholding would 
fail if detected,” outright admissions of deliberate error are hard to 
come by, and it is highly questionable that ineffective investigation 
will fail as a defense strategy solely because a court vaguely suspects 
subterfuge.  On the contrary, as the (short-lived) result in Thompson v. 
Bell implies, courts have proven themselves willing to permit 
challenges to death sentences even amid strong suggestions of 
impropriety by defense counsel.180
Most important, if the failure to reliably secure reversal represents 
the Achilles heel of intentional error generally, perhaps the 
inadequate investigation or presentation of mitigating evidence will 
subvert a death sentence often enough to constitute smart strategy.  
Overall, claims alleging the ineffective investigation or presentation 
of mitigation evidence fail far more often than they succeed.181  
Certain scenarios may exist, however, in which the likely benefits of 
an ineffectual investigation or presentation will outweigh the 
potential drawbacks.  For example, what if counsel suspects that 
 178. Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1197–99. 
 179. Although there is no constitutional right to post-conviction counsel, even in 
death-penalty cases, Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8–10 (1989), states routinely 
make attorneys available to condemned inmates, id. at 14–15 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (noting that “no prisoner on death row in Virginia,” the state at issue in 
the Murray case, “has been unable to obtain counsel to represent him in 
postconviction proceedings”).  See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) (2000) (conferring upon 
individuals sentenced to death a right to appointed counsel in federal habeas 
proceedings); DAVID R. DOW, EXECUTED ON A TECHNICALITY:   LETHAL INJUSTICE ON 
AMERICA’S DEATH ROW 62 (2005) (discussing the provision of counsel to habeas 
petitioners in capital cases); Sarah L. Thomas, A Legislative Challenge:  A Proposed 
Model Statute to Provide for the Appointment of Counsel in State Habeas Corpus Proceedings 
for Indigent Petitioners, 54 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1155–58 (2005) (outlining the different 
approaches embraced by the states with regard to providing counsel in habeas cases). 
 180. 373 F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 545 U.S. 794 (2005). 
 181. See supra text accompanying notes 60–67. 
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further investigation would yield evidence that the defendant has a 
severe mental health issue, or experienced a childhood replete with 
suffering?  Might a failure to take the extra effort needed to confirm 
and flesh out this information make sense, given that courts seem 
inclined to reverse death sentences issued by juries that were denied 
an opportunity to hear this evidence?  After all, if Judge Boggs is 
correct, a failure to pursue this evidence may only modestly increase 
the defendant’s chances of receiving the death penalty, but it will all 
but ensure that any death sentence will be overturned.182  Or what if 
counsel fully investigates powerful mitigating material and 
appreciates its significance:   does it make more sense to present this 
evidence at trial, or to file it away, in the hope that a reviewing court 
will assign prejudicial error to the decision not to proffer the 
evidence and send the matter back for resentencing? 
The answer to these questions begins with the footwear of a 
defense attorney who is contemplating deliberate ineffective 
assistance at the time of trial.  If one stands in these shoes, instead of 
those of a commentator having the benefit of hindsight, a basic 
problem with sandbagging through a failure to investigate or present 
mitigation evidence becomes obvious:   trial counsel generally will not 
know with any certainty what further investigation will yield, without 
knowing so much that their decisions will be addressed under the 
deferential “failure to present” rubric instead of the more stringent 
“failure to investigate” standard.  Attorneys who have conducted little 
or no penalty-phase investigation may not appreciate what evidence a 
reasonable effort will deliver, leaving them in the dark as to whether a 
sandbagging strategy will work.  This uncertainty may lead to 
additional investigation, designed to pin down what mitigation 
evidence exists.  But once an attorney comes into possession of the 
facts discovered through this investigation, the standard of review 
shifts; his or her decisions about whether to present this evidence will 
be reviewed more deferentially than a decision not to investigate 
would have been.183
Assume, for example, that conversations between an attorney and 
his or her client yield suggestions of childhood abuse, or a mental 
defect or illness.  If counsel proceeds no further, he or she likely will 
not know for certain what the abuse entailed, who else could 
 182. Poindexter v. Mitchell, 454 F.3d 564, 589 (6th Cir. 2006) (Boggs, C.J., 
concurring). 
 183. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984) (providing that the 
degree of judicial deference to counsel’s decisions will depend in large measure 
upon the thoroughness of his or her underlying investigation). 
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corroborate it, or whether the mental defect or illness was of a sort 
likely to elicit sympathy in subsequent habeas proceedings.  In this 
case, while a finding of ineffective assistance for a failure to 
investigate may be guaranteed, a finding of prejudice is anything but 
assured.  If, on the other hand, counsel pursues these leads and 
discovers that the client was abused, or suffers from a significant 
mental illness or defect, then a reviewing court likely will examine his 
or her subsequent decisions about what to do with this evidence 
under a “failure to present” standard.  Under this more forgiving 
approach, courts will supply a strategic rationale for a decision not to 
present the evidence—if one exists.  This holds true even if the trial 
attorney describes his or her work as ineffective, or as lacking any 
strategic purpose.184  The test for ineffective assistance is an objective 
one, so that if any reasonable attorney would not have presented the 
evidence in question, an ineffective assistance claim will founder.185
Defense attorneys contemplating intentional ineffective assistance 
thus find themselves on the horns of a dilemma.  If they conduct no 
investigation at all, they rarely will know whether a sandbagging 
strategy will work.  But the more investigation they undertake, and 
the more mitigation material they uncover, the more difficult it will 
become to convince a reviewing court that no strategic rationale 
supported a decision not to present this evidence at trial.  Greater 
certainty about what mitigation evidence exists thus comes at the cost 
of a diminishing likelihood of subverting a death sentence by failing 
to use this evidence.  This problem is exacerbated by the fact that 
evidence of abuse, and especially mental illness, rarely has an entirely 
mitigating effect.  More often, this material either contains a “double 
edge” or will open the door to additional aggravating facts supplied 
by the prosecution.186  As more investigation is undertaken, more of 
these aggravating facts will come to the forefront.  These facts will 
provide reviewing courts with additional reasons why a reasonable 
 184. See Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 960 (11th Cir. 1992) (observing that 
affidavits by attorneys declaring their own ineffectiveness are accorded “no 
substantial weight”); Harris v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 756, 761 n.4 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(“[B]ecause ineffectiveness is a question which we must decide, admissions of 
deficient performance by attorneys are not decisive.”); United States v. Cano, 494 F. 
Supp. 2d 243, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“An attorney’s statements regarding her own 
ineffectiveness are not, by themselves, proof of unreasonable representation.”). 
 185. See Williams v. Head, 185 F.3d 1223, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999) (rejecting an 
ineffective assistance claim because, in the final analysis, the court found that it 
“cannot say that no reasonable attorney would have done as [petitioner’s trial 
counsel] did”). 
 186. E.g., Rector v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 551, 564 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting the 
objective reasonableness of counsel’s decision not to present potentially mitigating 
evidence that also had negative connotations). 
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attorney might have decided not to present the mitigation evidence 
uncovered by counsel’s investigation. 
Even if defense attorneys have a sixth sense concerning what 
further research will yield, deliberate failures to investigate or present 
mitigation evidence still may not make sense.  For one thing, a 
decision to sandbag may necessitate some awkward conversations with 
the client.  Counsel contemplating penalty-phase sandbagging could 
inform the defendant of their plan, lie about their intentions, or try 
to avoid the topic.  If an attorney takes the first path, he or she must 
hope that the defendant will not bring the conversation to the 
attention of the court.  If the discussion is disclosed by the defendant, 
the odds of professional discipline will soar upward and the 
sandbagging strategy will fall apart.  If defense counsel takes the 
second or third routes, then he or she may have to explain to the 
defendant why leads are being ignored, which may not be the best 
way to ensure a positive attorney-client working relationship. 
Yet this uncertainty and awkwardness may be the least of the 
problems associated with tactical failures to investigate or present 
mitigation evidence.  After all, uncertainty about whether a strategy 
will work does not necessarily mean that the approach is 
counterproductive or otherwise unsound.  If intentional ineffective 
assistance might work, and has no downside, then it may represent 
sound strategy even if counsel cannot anticipate the precise 
likelihood that it will succeed.  As discussed below, however, there 
exist at least five reasons why these machinations may backfire on the 
defense. 
A.  The “Reasonable Investigation” Standard 
First, a court reviewing an ineffective assistance claim might 
conclude that a “reasonable investigation” at the time of trial would 
not have turned up the mitigation material acquired through post-
conviction investigation.  As previously discussed, the law requires 
only that counsel conduct a reasonable investigation.187  Counsel can 
press further than that, but they will not be found ineffective if they 
fail to do so.  And so, when a defendant or petitioner alleges 
ineffective assistance by trial counsel, the condemned claimant must 
establish that the helpful evidence he or she presents in post-
conviction proceedings could have been located through a 
 187. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91. 
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reasonable investigation at the time of trial.188  If this evidence would 
not have been found through the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
trial counsel will not be considered ineffective for failing to find it.189  
Expert witness testimony poses a particular problem on this front, 
since it may be difficult to establish that competent efforts at the time 
of trial would have located an expert who would have testified in 
substantially the same way as an expert adduced during post-trial 
proceedings.190  This attribute of ineffective assistance review can 
mean that if evidence will only be found through superlative effort, 
this material must be found by trial counsel for it ever to be usable in 
mitigation.  A trial attorney who conducts an inadequate investigation 
thus may ensure that a client will never be allowed to present certain 
mitigating facts in the fight for life. 
 188. Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1447 n.17 (11th Cir. 1987), withdrawn in 
part, 833 F.2d 250 (11th Cir. 1987) (detailing the showing that a habeas petitioner 
must make when premising an ineffective assistance claim on a failure to adduce 
expert testimony at trial); State v. Davis, 814 S.W.2d 593, 603–04 (Mo. 1991) (en 
banc) (“When a movant claims ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to locate 
and present expert witnesses, he must show that such experts existed at the time of 
trial, that they could have been located through reasonable investigation, and that 
the testimony of these witnesses would have benefited movant’s defense.”). 
 189. See, e.g., In re Thomas, 129 P.3d 49, 61 (Cal. 2006) (agreeing with a referee’s 
conclusion that certain witnesses located by the defense through post-conviction 
investigation would not have been located through reasonable efforts at the time of 
trial).  The Thomas court observed that “it is one thing to conduct such [a thorough] 
investigation, turning over every conceivable stone, in the context of a habeas corpus 
proceeding.  It is another to argue that counsel, provided with a lengthy ‘cold call’-
type list and a few months to prepare, would be constitutionally deficient for failing 
to have an investigator run through every name on that list, sifting through dross in 
the hopes of finding a few nuggets of gold.”  Id. 
 190. See Ringo v. Roper, 472 F.3d 1001, 1006 (8th Cir. 2007) (observing that the 
petitioner, alleging ineffective assistance due to a failure to adequately investigate his 
post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), had to show that “it was reasonably probable 
that if counsel had retained a clinical psychologist, the psychologist would have 
diagnosed him with PTSD”); Elledge, 823 F.2d at 1447 n.17 (explaining how a 
petitioner might satisfy his or her burden on this issue). 
In Elledge, the court suggested that 
[t]o prove it is reasonably probable that such an expert could have been 
found by a competent lawyer exercising a reasonable amount of diligence, a 
petitioner could present testimony from (a) members of the bar relating to 
the amount of investigation that is reasonable in such a situation and the 
ease or difficulty in finding such experts at that time, (b) psychiatrists, or 
other experts in the field, relating to how widely the proposed theory was 
accepted at the time the investigation occurred and the ease an attorney 
would have had in getting such experts, and (c) any other relevant testimony 
that would tend to demonstrate it was reasonably probable that reasonable 
diligence would uncover an expert similar to the ones eventually located. 
823 F.2d at 1447 n.17. 
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B. Absence of Prejudice 
Second, reviewing courts may conclude that the missing mitigation 
evidence, if located and presented at trial, would not have affected 
the sentence.191  This result will follow if the evidence is regarded as 
cumulative of material that had been presented at trial, because 
“[c]ounsel does not render ineffective assistance by failing to present 
cumulative evidence.”192  To establish prejudice due to a failure to 
investigate or present mitigation evidence, a defendant or habeas 
petitioner must establish that the missing material differed in a 
“substantial way—in strength and subject matter—from the evidence 
actually presented at sentencing.”193  Evidence that merely 
“elaborate[s] on” what was presented at sentencing will not suffice to 
show prejudice.194  This new material also must differ from the 
evidence that was presented at the guilt phase, for a court may 
conclude that guilt-phase evidence was still fresh in jurors’ minds 
when they considered which sentence to issue.195  The incorporation 
of guilt-phase evidence into the prejudice calculus means that 
counsel contemplating sandbagging at the penalty phase may have to 
weaken their guilt-phase presentation, too, if the plan is to succeed. 
Nor will a failure to investigate or present non-cumulative 
mitigation evidence necessarily undermine a death sentence.  On its 
own, additional mitigation evidence describing a defendant’s 
substance abuse, a difficult but not abusive childhood, or the 
defendant’s positive traits will only occasionally subvert a death 
sentence, because courts commonly regard this evidence as having 
only a modest mitigating effect.196  As previously discussed, evidence 
 191. E.g., Dill v. Allen, 488 F.3d 1344, 1362 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding no prejudice 
to the petitioner, even if the court were to presume that his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance by failing to seek out and present mitigation evidence, because 
whatever additional evidence might have been uncovered and presented would not 
have significantly altered the petitioner’s sentencing profile). 
 192. Jones v. State, 928 So. 2d 1178, 1187 (Fla. 2006); see Van Poyck v. Fla. Dep’t of 
Corr., 290 F.3d 1318, 1324 n.7 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A petitioner cannot establish 
ineffective assistance by identifying additional evidence that could have been 
presented when that evidence is merely cumulative.”); Schofield v. Holsey, 642 
S.E.2d 56, 61 (Ga. 2007) (finding a lack of prejudice, due to the cumulative nature of 
the new mitigation material presented by the habeas petitioner). 
 193. Hill v. Mitchell, 400 F.3d 308, 319 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 194. Williams v. Allen, 458 F.3d 1233, 1245 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 195. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699 (2002) (finding reasonable a failure to 
recall at sentencing witnesses who testified the guilt phase, as their testimony was 
“still fresh to the jury”); Ponticelli v. State, 941 So. 2d 1073, 1097 (Fla. 2006) (finding 
a lack of prejudice where mitigating testimony not presented in the sentencing phase 
would have been cumulative of the evidence presented at the guilt phase). 
 196. E.g., Stewart v. Dep’t of Corr., 476 F.3d 1193, 1217 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We 
have repeatedly recognized that evidence of a defendant’s alcohol or drug abuse 
holds little mitigating value.”); Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 1002–04 (9th Cir. 
  
2008] TACTICAL INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN CAPITAL TRIALS 1683 
                                                          
regarding a defendant’s mental disease or defects, or physical and 
sexual abuse, tends to carry more weight.197  Even so, the potency 
accorded to evidence of childhood trauma varies from court to 
court,198 and many judges will scrutinize allegations of “brain damage” 
and other mental impairments for any suggestion of hyperbole.199  
Most courts also require that mental ailments or impairments satisfy a 
certain severity threshold before they will be accorded significant 
mitigating weight.200  In its recent decision in Ponticelli v. State,201 for 
example, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the mental 
health testimony proffered by the petitioner in post-conviction 
proceedings would not have affected his sentence, since this evidence 
did not indicate that he suffered from a “major mental illness” or was 
“mentally retarded.”202
Also, in situations where the missing mitigation evidence has 
undeniable potency, a court evaluating an ineffective assistance claim 
may conclude that the evidence entails an inextricable aggravating 
component that offsets its mitigating effect, or that it would have 
inevitably opened the door to devastating rebuttal evidence had it 
been presented at trial.  In either event, a failure to locate or present 
the mitigation evidence may be regarded as harmless.203  Finally, a 
handful of capital crimes are so heinous, and the aggravating factors 
so pronounced, that some reviewing courts will not assign prejudice 
to a failure to find or produce mitigation evidence.204  In all of these 
2002) (finding nonprejudicial a failure by counsel to locate and adduce certain 
character evidence); Housel v. Head, 238 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(describing this mitigation evidence as a “two-edged sword”). 
 197. See supra text accompanying note 99.  
 198. See Van Poyck v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 290 F.3d 1318, 1324–25 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(concluding that not all reasonable attorneys would present evidence of childhood 
abuse); Tompkins v. Moore, 193 F.3d 1327, 1337 (11th Cir. 1999) (questioning the 
mitigating value of evidence of childhood abuse when the defendant is no longer 
young at the time of the crime). 
 199. See, e.g., Smith v. Mitchell, 348 F.3d 177, 201–02 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding 
that a diagnosis of a “mild diffuse cerebral dysfunction” did not alter the balance of 
aggravating and mitigating factors). 
 200. E.g., Henley v. Bell, 487 F.3d 379, 387–88 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding no 
prejudice in the omission of psychiatric expert testimony that defendant had 
learning disabilities and was depressed at time of crime). 
 201. 941 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2006). 
 202. Id. at 1098. 
 203. See, e.g., Emmett v. Kelly, 474 F.3d 154, 170–71 (4th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the 
petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim because, inter alia, his mitigation evidence 
would have been offset by related aggravating facts). 
 204. See Knight v. Quarterman, No. 04-70042, 2006 WL 1793586, at *16 (5th Cir. 
June 30, 2006) (finding no prejudice even if ineffective assistance was assumed).  In 
Knight, the crimes were “so horrible and cruel that it is extremely unlikely that a 
reasonable juror would have been willing to spare [the petitioner’s] life, even if 
presented with the evidence that he now says trial counsel should have presented.”  
Id.; see also Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 1228–29 (11th Cir. 2001) 
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situations, a sandbagging strategy will founder on the shoals of 
Strickland’s prejudice prong. 
C. Incompetence of Post-Conviction Counsel 
Third, a strategy that relies entirely on habeas counsel to vindicate 
a defendant’s rights discounts the fact that these lawyers can make 
mistakes, too.205  One recurring problem in this vein involves a failure 
by habeas counsel to adequately develop the record.  The burden lies 
on the habeas petitioner to show both ineffective assistance and 
prejudice.206  Habeas attorneys sometimes fail to gather the affidavits 
or elicit the testimony necessary to support one or both of these 
elements.  Courts have rejected claims alleging a failure to investigate 
or present mitigation evidence because the record did not establish 
what the uncalled mitigation witnesses would have testified to, had 
they been called at trial, or that they would have been available and 
willing to testify at all.207  Another recurring problem concerns a 
failure by habeas counsel to obtain an affidavit from the petitioner’s 
trial attorney that describes the investigatory steps that were taken at 
trial.  Without this evidence, courts have presumed that trial counsel 
performed reasonably, seriously weakening the ineffective assistance 
claim.208
The likelihood of other sorts of post-trial errors by counsel also 
casts a shadow over sandbagging strategies.  Procedural bars that can 
(discussing how the aggravated nature of some murders will render harmless a 
failure to investigate or present mitigation evidence). 
 205. See Robbins, supra note 10, at 64 (discussing some of the ways in which post-
conviction counsel can be ineffective). 
 206. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). 
 207. In Hubbard v. Haley, for example, the petitioner asserted that trial counsel 
“could have produced family, friends, and witnesses who could have testified 
concerning [the petitioner’s] alcoholism, mental retardation, and his previous 
successful adjustments to prison.”  317 F.3d 1245, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003).  The court 
rejected this argument, however, because the petitioner offered no proof that such 
witnesses existed or were available to testify at the time of his trial.  Id. 
 208. See Link v. Luebbers, 469 F.3d 1197, 1203 (8th Cir. 2006) (“We have no 
testimony from [defense counsel] regarding her reasons for declining to pursue 
further psychological testing.  In the absence of such testimony, we have no reason to 
believe [her] performance was anything other than ‘reasonable professional 
assistance.’”); Reyes v. Quarterman, No. 05-70024, 2006 WL 2474268, at *9 n.4 (5th 
Cir. Aug. 28, 2006) (remarking on the lack of an affidavit from trial counsel, and 
noting that the record would have been “far better developed for review” had such 
an affidavit been provided); Tinsley v. Million, 399 F.3d 796, 810 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(observing that the petitioner’s habeas counsel had failed to supply affidavits relating 
what mitigation witnesses would have testified to, if called); Carter v. Mitchell, 443 
F.3d 517, 532 (6th Cir. 2001) (concluding that without an affidavit from the 
petitioner’s trial attorney, “we must assume that counsel did investigate but 
ultimately decided that the best strategy at sentencing was not to present the 
testimony of [the petitioner’s] family members”). 
  
2008] TACTICAL INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN CAPITAL TRIALS 1685 
                                                          
trip up post-conviction counsel and preclude consideration of an 
ineffective assistance claim on the merits are seemingly 
omnipresent.209  Federal habeas procedures, in particular, contain 
many traps for the unwary or unprepared.210  Most notably, as a 
general matter federal habeas courts will not grant habeas relief upon 
a claim raised by a state prisoner unless that claim has been properly 
exhausted in state court.211  The exhaustion rule has led to the 
rejection of several habeas claims alleging a failure to investigate or 
present mitigating evidence.212  Among them, the fate of Johnny Joe 
Martinez serves as a cautionary tale to attorneys and defendants 
tempted to concoct an ineffective assistance claim for presentation in 
later proceedings.  In Martinez v. Johnson,213 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that Martinez’s failure to 
investigate claim was procedurally barred due to a failure to 
 209. Furthermore, procedural missteps in state court may preclude federal habeas 
review, for a federal habeas court cannot “review a question of federal law decided by 
a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is 
independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). 
 210. See Moses v. Branker, No. 06-8, 2007 WL 3083548, at *2–3 (4th Cir. Oct. 23, 
2007) (finding a habeas corpus claim to be procedurally barred because it expanded 
upon the failure-to-investigate claim that had been presented to the state court); Diaz 
v. Quarterman, No. 05-70057, 2007 WL 1969649, at *4 (5th Cir. July 3, 2007) 
(refusing to consider affidavits presented by the petitioner because they were 
discoverable “new evidence” not properly presented to the state court, per 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(e)(2) (2000)).  One such pitfall is the standard one-year statute of limitations 
for filing a federal habeas petition, with the limitations period starting to run when 
the conviction becomes final on direct review, and tolled while an application for 
state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court.  28 U.S.C.  
§ 2244(d) (2000).  According to one commentator, this statute of limitations “has 
deprived thousands of potential habeas petitioners of any federal review of their 
convictions, and in some cases, their death sentences.”  John H. Blume, AEDPA:   The 
“Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 289 (2006).  But cf. KING ET AL., supra 
note 35, at 46 (observing that the statute of limitations defense has been used 
infrequently in capital habeas cases). 
 211. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2000).  
 212. Decisions that have rejected, due to a failure to exhaust, ineffective assistance 
claims brought by habeas petitioners include:  Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 650 
(9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting an ineffective assistance claim on the ground, among 
others, that the petitioner had failed to present it to the state courts first); and Kunkle 
v. Dretke, 352 F.3d 980, 988 (5th Cir. 2003) (affirming the dismissal of the petitioner’s 
ineffective assistance claim on failure-to-exhaust grounds).  A failure to exhaust prior 
to seeking federal habeas relief can be utterly fatal to an ineffective assistance claim if 
“the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to 
meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.”  
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1.  A limited exception to standard procedural default 
rules applies where a “prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual 
prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that 
failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”  Id. 
at 750.  See KING ET AL., supra note 35, at 47–48 (discussing the dismissal of habeas 
claims brought by condemned petitioners due to a failure to exhaust, or upon a 
procedural default). 
 213. 255 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001).
  
1686 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1645 
                                                          
exhaust.214  Martinez’s habeas attorney had not presented this claim 
to the state courts, despite repeated pleas by his client.215  The court 
determined that no exception to the exhaustion rule applied, 
reasoning that because Martinez had no constitutional right to 
habeas counsel, he could not complain about errors committed by 
his attorney in collateral proceedings.216  Martinez was executed on 
May 22, 2002.217
D.  Adverse Findings of Fact and Rulings of Law 
Fourth, even meritorious claims alleging a failure to investigate or 
present mitigating evidence typically must run the gauntlet of an 
evidentiary hearing or similar procedures at which the defendant or 
petitioner’s allegations will be tested.218  At these proceedings, the 
defendant or petitioner bears the burden of adducing facts that 
support his or her ineffective assistance claim.  The judge who 
oversees these sessions may not credit the defendant or petitioner’s 
assertions or evidence.  For example, a judge may conclude that a 
witness or document would not have been located in the exercise of 
 214. Id. at 239. 
 215. See generally DOW, supra note 179, at 62–79 (discussing the Martinez case). 
 216. Martinez, 255 F.3d at 241; see Hill v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1015, 1025 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(observing that default by collateral counsel cannot serve as “cause” that excuses a 
procedural default); Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 1996); Nolan v. 
Armontrout, 973 F.2d 615, 617 (8th Cir. 1992).  
 217. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Executed Offenders, http://www.tdcj. 
state.tx.us/stat/executedoffenders.htm (last visited June 1, 2008). 
 218. For example, to flesh out a habeas petition alleging a failure to investigate in 
a capital case, the California Supreme Court appointed a judge to conduct a 
reference hearing at which evidence would be heard and findings made relating to a 
the following questions: 
1. What mitigating character and background evidence could have been, but 
was not, presented by petitioner’s trial attorneys at his penalty trial?; 2. What 
investigative steps by trial counsel, if any, would have led to each such item of 
information?; 3. What investigative steps, if any, did trial counsel take in an 
effort to gather mitigating evidence to be presented at the penalty phase?; 4. 
What tactical or financial constraints, if any, weighed against the 
investigation or presentation of mitigating character and background 
evidence at the penalty phase?; 5. What evidence, damaging to petitioner, 
but not presented by the prosecution at the guilt or penalty trial, would likely 
have been presented in rebuttal, if petitioner had introduced any such 
mitigating character and background evidence?; 6. Did petitioner himself 
request that either the investigation or the presentation of mitigating 
evidence at the penalty phase be curtailed in any manner?  If so, what 
specifically did petitioner request? 
In re Andrews, 52 P.3d 656, 659 (Cal. 2002).  In federal courts, “[o]n application for a 
writ of habeas corpus, evidence may be taken orally or by deposition, or, in the 
discretion of the judge, by affidavit. If affidavits are admitted any party shall have the 
right to propound written interrogatories to the affiants, or to file answering 
affidavits.”  28 U.S.C. § 2246 (2000). 
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reasonable diligence,219 or that the testimony of a witness or witnesses 
testifying on behalf of the defendant or petitioner is not credible,220 
or that the testimony concerning mitigating facts is too vague to carry 
much weight.  The (remote) possibility also exists that the judge will 
detect sandbagging,221 which may prove lethal to the ineffective 
assistance claim.  A defendant or petitioner will find it difficult to 
counter these adverse findings in subsequent proceedings.222  In 
important respects, then, a sandbagging strategy exchanges the goal 
of persuading just one out of twelve laymen that a defense witness is 
credible for an all-or-nothing credibility determination by a single 
judge. 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act223  (“AEDPA”) 
further complicates matters for condemned defendants who raise 
ineffective assistance claims in federal habeas petitions.  This law 
fastens to these proceedings a healthy deference to state court 
determinations of fact and law.  Pursuant to AEDPA, 
an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be 
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 
 219. E.g., In re Thomas, 129 P.3d 49, 59 (Cal. 2006) (relating a magistrate’s finding 
that some claimed witnesses would not have been located at the time of the 
petitioner’s trial through reasonable efforts by the defense). 
 220. E.g., Perkins v. Quarterman, No. 07-70010, 2007 WL 3390953, at *6 (5th Cir. 
Nov. 15, 2007); see Buckner v. Polk, 453 F.3d 195, 203–04 (4th Cir. 2006) (deferring 
to a determination by a state judge who found affidavits supplied by the petitioner 
were not credible, since the experts who supplied the affidavits based the conclusions 
therein on witnesses who were “motivated to take a different tact [sic] by an imposed 
sentence of death”); Parker v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Corr., 331 F.3d 764, 788 (11th 
Cir. 2003) (deferring to a finding by the state courts that the testimony of a potential 
mitigation witness was not at all persuasive); Ponticelli v. State, 941 So. 2d 1073, 1098 
(Fla. 2006) (deferring to the trial court’s finding that testimony presented by the 
petitioner relating to his brain damage was less credible than other, conflicting, 
testimony). 
 221. See United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 46 n.9 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[T]o the extent 
that petitioners and their trial counsel may jointly fabricate . . . claims later on, the 
district courts will have ample opportunity to judge credibility at evidentiary 
hearings.”). 
 222. In a habeas corpus proceeding initiated by a prisoner who is in custody 
pursuant to a judgment of a state court, “a determination of a factual issue made by a 
[s]tate court shall be presumed to be correct.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2000).  The 
petitioner “shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by 
clear and convincing evidence.”  Id.  Fact-finding by the federal district courts is 
reviewed under the “clearly erroneous” standard, a “significantly deferential” brand 
of review, whereby the reviewing court “must accept the district court’s factual 
findings absent a ‘definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’”  
Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Syrax, 
235 F.3d 422, 427 (9th Cir. 2000)).  But cf. Correll v. Ryan, 465 F.3d 1006, 1024 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority opinion in a failure-to-
investigate case of disregarding the fact-finding of the district court). 
 223. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 
18, 21, 28 U.S.C.). 
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merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 
claim—(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) 
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 
State court proceeding.224
AEDPA thus circumscribes habeas review by federal courts of 
claims previously adjudicated by state courts.  Under AEDPA, “a 
federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court 
concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court 
decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or 
incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.”225  It 
is unclear whether these provisions of AEDPA have substantially 
dampened the prospects of federal habeas petitioners.226  At a 
minimum, however, some federal courts have implied that they might 
have decided an ineffective assistance habeas corpus claim in a 
petitioner’s favor, but for AEDPA’s strictures.227
E. Disappearing Evidence 
Fifth, defense evidence may degrade or vanish during the interval 
between trial and post-trial proceedings.  Witnesses who might have 
attested to mitigating facts at the time of trial may disappear, forget, 
die, or simply want to move on with their lives.  Likewise, as time 
passes it may become increasingly difficult for an expert witness to 
discern whether the defendant or petitioner suffered from a recently 
diagnosed mental-health problem at the time of the crime.  This 
uncertainty will lessen the mitigating effect of the expert’s 
 224. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000).  A decision is “contrary to” clearly established 
federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the 
Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently 
than [the Supreme] Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.”  Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000).  A decision “involve[s] an unreasonable 
application of[] clearly established [f]ederal law” when “the state court identifies the 
correct legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably 
applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.”  Id. at 413. 
 225. Williams, 529 U.S. at 411. 
 226. See generally Blume, supra note 10 (advancing the thesis that Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act has not substantially affected federal review of 
habeas claims, at least in cases where the federal court has reached the merits of the 
claim). 
 227. E.g., Ringo v. Roper, 472 F.3d 1001, 1006 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Regardless of how 
we might decide the [petitioner’s] ineffective assistance claim in the first instance, 
our actions are tightly circumscribed by AEDPA.”). 
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diagnosis.228  The passage of time also may undermine the credibility 
of other witnesses adduced by the defense.  These witnesses may be 
accused of inventing mitigating facts after individuals who might have 
challenged their accounts died or disappeared, or simply of 
remembering things that did not happen.229
It is true that time can make aggravating evidence vanish as well.  
But there is a catch:   if a prosecution witness testified in the first trial, 
transcripts of the testimony may be admissible at retrial under an 
exception to the hearsay rule.230  Dry transcripts lack the punch of live 
testimony, but something is better than nothing, and nothing may be 
what the defense has after a significant delay.  For example, if the 
defendant’s trial counsel dies during the interval between trial and 
post-trial proceedings, it may be impossible to know what documents 
he or she reviewed, whom he or she interviewed, and what the 
attorney’s thought process was at the time of trial.  In these 
circumstances, courts “presume the attorney ‘did what he should 
have done, and that he exercised reasonable professional 
judgment,’”231 and the defendant or petitioner bears the burden of 
rebutting this presumption.232
These various considerations bearing upon the viability of a 
sandbagging strategy mean that, to be more complete and accurate, 
the Boggs calculus should be rewritten to provide as follows: 
If I make an all-out investigation, and analyze and present to the 
jury every possible mitigating circumstance, especially of the 
‘troubled childhood’ variety, it is my professional judgment that I 
may thereby increase the probability of this extremely repellant 
client escaping the death penalty from 10% to 12%.  On the other 
hand, if I present reasonably available evidence that I think has as 
good a chance as any other in securing the slim chance of mercy 
from the jury, I will have a [chance—the precise odds of which cannot be 
known, absent further investigation that will only weaken my sandbagging 
strategy—]of overturning the extremely likely death penalty 
judgment 10–15 years down the road [assuming that (1) the 
mitigation evidence I fail to discover is sufficiently potent to undermine the 
 228. See Carter v. Mitchell, 443 F.3d 517, 529 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that an 
expert adduced by the petitioner in post-conviction proceedings “did not address 
what impact events in the intervening five years could have had on his diagnosis”). 
 229. Cf. Buckner v. Polk, 453 F.3d 195, 203–04 (4th Cir. 2006) (describing 
findings made by the judge who took evidence on the petitioner’s habeas corpus 
claim and found the petitioner’s witnesses not credible). 
 230. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (identifying prior testimony by an unavailable 
declarant as an exception to the hearsay rule). 
 231. Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897, 933 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Williams 
v. Head, 185 F.3d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999)). 
 232. Id. 
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death sentence and not offset by related aggravating facts; (2) this evidence 
would have been located through a reasonable investigation; (3) habeas 
counsel is more effective than I am in representing my client; (4) the 
evidentiary hearing on the claim alleging that I was ineffective is heard 
before a judge who finds the mitigating witnesses credible; and (5) the 
witnesses and other evidence that I could have located and produced now 
with sufficient effort do not vanish during the interval between today and 
whenever the habeas investigation occurs.  If all these factors align,] I will 
thus have secured many additional years of life for the client, and 
he may very likely avoid capital punishment altogether.233
This amended calculus is less than compelling from the defense 
perspective.  The difficulty with which the efficacy of a sandbagging 
strategy can be evaluated in advance, and the existence of so many 
variables that may defeat these stratagems, means that the prevailing 
critique of deliberate error in general also applies to the specific 
tactic of sandbagging through a failure to investigate or produce 
mitigation evidence:  rarely will these methods produce a better 
outcome for the client. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion establishes that sandbagging at the 
penalty phase is usually bad strategy.  There remains a possibility, 
however, that in rare instances intentional error will make sense.  
Pinning down these instances requires a differentiation between the 
reliability of information and the specificity of this information.  As 
discussed, the more investigation an attorney conducts, and the more 
information is gleaned from this work, the more deferentially courts 
will review counsel’s decisions regarding what to do with the acquired 
material.  Normally, this additional effort will be necessary to 
determine whether a mitigating fact or facts exist.  But occasionally 
counsel will receive reliable, if vague, information concerning a 
potent mitigating factor without having conducted a thorough 
investigation.  This information is reliable, but it is not necessarily 
specific.  The shift from a “failure to investigate” inquiry to a “failure 
to produce” review is tied to the amount of information obtained by 
counsel, and the specificity of that information.  If an attorney 
obtains reliable but incomplete information concerning an 
important mitigating fact, and decides not to pursue this lead, most 
 233. Poindexter v. Mitchell, 454 F.3d 564, 589 (6th Cir. 2006) (Boggs, C.J., 
concurring). 
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courts will review the attorney’s decisions under more stringent 
standards.234   
With this knowledge, counsel may decide that sandbagging is the 
only hope for a client if the odds of avoiding the death penalty at the 
first trial look sufficiently bleak (for whatever reason).  To combat 
these tactics, courts that encounter inexplicable failures by counsel to 
conduct further investigations into promising mitigation leads should 
strongly consider referring the culpable attorney to the appropriate 
disciplinary authorities, or referring the matter to a referee for an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of deliberate ineffectiveness.  The 
greatest drawback of such a strategy, however, remains its likely 
failure, even under optimal conditions.  An attorney who sandbags in 
a capital case is betting the client’s life, and the deck is stacked in 
favor of death. 
 
 234. In this circumstance a contemporary court tasked with reviewing counsel’s 
conduct likely will follow Wiggins and find that “counsel chose to abandon their 
investigation at an unreasonable juncture, making a fully informed decision with 
respect to sentencing strategy impossible.”  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 527–28 
(2003). 
